Wamu WKN 893906 News !

das war die Nr. 10!
Es ging mir nicht um die Grammatik - sondern um Toleranz!
OW

so wie es aussieht, werden die DIMEQ der Class 22 zugeordnet.

Hatte gehofft dass die DIMEQ in eine höhere Klasse kommen und ausserhalb des Wasserfalls behandelt werden. Jetzt müssen die WAMUQs wohl doch mit den DIMEQ teilen (sind zumindest dann in einer Klasse).

Gruss,

Greify

Ich würde mir wünschen, dass die Sachlage mehr diskutiert wird. Pjöngjang stellt die aktuelle Entwicklung WAMU/DIMEQ hier ein und es wird weiter über grammatikalisch richtiges Deutsch und Beamtentum diskutiert?

Just got off the phone with Edgar Sargent. He says he hasn't read the opinion yet - but didn't seemed surprised that she ruled the Dime as equity - but stated that he was pretty sure there wasn't a 'trigger event' either. Q&A is being worked on - complicated because of all the rules - we'll have as soon as they can get it to us. He thinks POR 7 is a good deal.

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Danke @ schwarzwälder !
Jetzt mußte ich meinen eigenen Beitrag 2 mal lesen, bevor ich den MEHR WIE DÄMLICHEN Schreibfehler entdeckte.
Wird mir nie wieder passieren.

defekter/unvollständiger Link:

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MfG.L:)

It’s not a stretch to imagine that Jon Corzine’s days as a wealthy free man may be numbered. The longer the mystery of the missing MF Global $1.2 billion goes on, the more we see him bob and weave in front of angry legislators, the more arrogant and entitled his excuses for knowing nothing sound, the more likely it is prosecutors will make him the poster boy for criminal prosecutions of Wall Street banksters.

Until recently Corzine was viewed as untouchable given his gold-plated, triple-crown of former titles – Senator, Governor, and Goldman Sachs CEO.  He has also been one of the Democratic Party’s and President Barack Obama’s staunchest political and financial supporters. Last month he made back-to-back appearances in the Senate and the House where, instead of pleading  the Fifth, he hemmed and hawed, neither admitting nor denying responsibility while claiming no knowledge of anything that went on at MF Global outside the range of his Blackberry and the Bloomberg screen.

Last week the rollback of support for Corzine from the Obama administration began. According to BusinessWeek, “Corzine was one of 41 donors who bundled more than $500,000 this year for Obama’s re-election effort, according to documents released by the campaign Oct. 14.” On Dec. 24 the magazine reported that President Obama’s re-election campaign returned $70,000 of Corzine’s personal campaign contributions.

So my first prediction is an easy one: This is the beginning of the end for Corzine. It’s gloves-off time. Look for an indictment by the Department of Justice’s Preet Bharara before the end of 2012 for criminal misappropriation of customer funds at MF Global.

My next prediction isn’t so obvious.

I think the Obama administration will pull Jamie Dimon down along with Jon Corzine.

They’ll do this to regain momentum with working-class voters—the 99%. Winning the November election, less than a year away, will require a significant show of prosecutorial force against banks and senior executives yet to be held accountable for the impact of the financial crisis on the middle class.

Jamie Dimon will have the misfortune, I believe, of catching a significant amount of fallout from the MF Global mess. As MF Global’s primary banker, JPMorgan Chase has been consistently accused in the media and by the attorney representing a customer coalition of taking advantage of the firm’s vulnerable financial state. Bloomberg News reported that the MF Global trustee said “certain” actions of JP Morgan Chase “are likely to be the subject of investigation.”

What JP Morgan Chase may have allowed – the use of customer funds to meet MF Global’s corporate obligations – is something JP Morgan was recently severely sanctioned for in the U.K. The bank’s London unit was fined a record 33.3 million pounds by the FSA, Britain’s financial regulator, for commingling client funds in its futures operation.

Dimon’s bank was also Bernie Madoff’s main bank. The trustee liquidating Madoff’s firm filed a revised lawsuit against the bank in June demanding a minimum of $19 billion in damages. JPMorgan Chase “was an active enabler of the Madoff Ponzi scheme,” The New York Times quoted David Sheehan, the attorney for Madoff bankruptcy trustee Irving Picard, as saying in June. The bank’s executives “not only should have known that a fraud was being perpetrated, they did know,” according to the statement from Sheehan.



In November a judge tossed out the claim against the bank, saying the trustee had no standing to bring claims on behalf of Madoff's clients. It could do this only for the bankrupt Madoff firm, the judge said. Picard, the trustee, plans to appeal because, as the Journal reported, the claims were reduced by billions. The trustee said he had “no choice but to appeal.”



In July, JP Morgan Chase agreed to pay $228 million in restitution and disgorgement in a settlement with  the U.S. Department of Justice in which the bank “admit[ted], acknowledge[d] and accept[ed] responsibility for illegal, anticompetitive conduct by its former employees ... from 2001 through 2006, [when] certain former JPMorgan employees at its municipal derivatives desk, entered into unlawful agreements to manipulate the bidding process and rig bids on municipal investment and related contracts.”

Financial crisis litigation chickens have also come home to roost for JP Morgan Chase.

The bank and Jamie Dimon must answer to the OCC for faulty foreclosures related to the two firms picked up as a bargain during the crisis – Bear Stearns/EMC and Washington Mutual. As I write this, Deloitte, the former auditor to Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual, is the “independent” consultant reviewing the foreclosure process and working on an estimate of JPMorgan’s financial exposure to borrowers.

JP Morgan Chase is still subject to negotiations with the state attorneys general who are pursuing their own multibillion dollar settlement with the top mortgage servicers over foreclosures. The banks have yet to sign on to any final agreement and so the check is still blank.

In April, the bank agreed to pay $56 million to settle claims in a class action lawsuit brought by soldiers over improper foreclosures of military families’ homes.

New York City Comptroller John C. Liu (who himself is under investigation over dubious campaign financing practices) and the NYC Pension Funds recently filed shareholder proposals calling on the boards of JP Morgan and two other financial services boards to “hold senior executives financially accountable for losses that result from excessive risk-taking or improper or unethical conduct.” JPMorgan has paid, according to the Comptroller, more than $100 million over the past 18 months to settle state or federal charges in connection with mortgage securities.

The Federal Housing Finance Agency, the conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, filed suit in September against 17 domestic and foreign banks, including J.P. Morgan Chase. The banks “falsely represented” the quality of the loans that were bundled into securities and sold to investors and “significantly overstated the ability of the borrower to repay their mortgage loans,” FHFA was cited as claiming in The Washington Post. JPMorgan Chase faces claims for selling $33 billion worth of fraudulent securities to the GSEs.

There’s more MBS exposure for JP Morgan Chase, but perhaps the biggest mistake Dimon made came right before Christmas when he joined the ranks of the rich in denouncing protesters and those hostile toward the privileged 1%. Bloomberg reports: “Jamie Dimon, the highest-paid chief executive officer among the heads of the six biggest U.S. banks, turned a question at an investors’ conference in New York this month into an occasion to defend wealth.”

With everything Dimon and JP Morgan Chase are facing, lunching with guys like Stanley Marcus who refer to OWS protesters as “imbeciles” was not the smartest PR move.

www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/...closuregate-1045376-1.html

Ich hab die Opinion gelesen. Dime hat keinen Anspruch auf Cash sondern nur auf WMI-Commons. Auch gesteht die Richterin ihnen nicht zu an den zu JPMC übertragenen Litigations zu partizipieren. Das ist also alles, was sie bekommen.

Eigentlich eine Unverschämtheit, dass JPMC sich die Sahne mitnimmt und WMI die Schuld begleichen lässt. Und die Richterin sieht das als vollkommen okay an.

f) Wann das letzte Mal gefurzt ? Habe ich lange nicht mehr riskiert ..... wegen Diarrhö.

Du solltest mal wieder was riskieren - ist hierbei fast wie an der Börse...

Wenns in die Hose geht, ist's eben sch... gelaufen, und wenns klappt, ist man hinterher sehr erleichtert ;-)

PS: Keine Handelsempfehlung.

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Zitat:
Assessing the Impact of WAMU’s Reorganization Plan on the Dime Litigation Tracking Warrants (DIMEQ)

www.distressed-debt-investing.com/2011/12/...al-and-dimeq.html

On December 12, 2011 Washington Mutual released the Seventh version of its Plan and Disclosure Statement. Woven within the Plan is a settlement agreement that provides for a recovery to equity holders in the form of Newco stock while dismissing charges levied by the Equity Committee against certain creditors for Insider Trading; charges that the Court found to be “colorable claims”. The recovery to equity represents a significant departure from the 6th Amended version of the Plan which did not provide for any recovery to equity.

These changes effectively put a floor of value underneath the litigation tracking warrants ("LTW") in a worst-case scenario if the Court rules against the LTW Holders in the Adversary Proceeding because the Plan provides that, in the event that the Court finds that the LTWs represent equity interests as opposed to either Class 12 General Unsecured claims or equitable lien claims, the LTWs will share a 30% stake in the Reorganized Company pari passu with common equity. In order to find that floor of value one must first determine what the reorganized Company is worth and then determine the proper conversion rate of LTWs into common equity to find the relative ownership percentage of this 30% stake for DIMEQ and WAMUQ. For simplicity’s sake we will assume that the Newco is worth $210 million which is the value assigned by the Court for the purposes of deciding “who gets what” under the Plan. As to the issue of the conversion rate, the Plan provides that the relative value of DIMEQ will be determined to be the lesser of:
• The amount estimated by the Bankruptcy Court as the maximum amount in which the Disputed Claims relating to the Dime Warrants may ultimately become Allowed Claims times the per share price of Common Equity Interests on a date established by the Bankruptcy Court bears to the market capitalization of all other Common Equity Interests (as determined by the Bankruptcy Court using such same per share price)
• The liquidated amount determined, pursuant to an order of the Bankruptcy Court, as the amount in which the Disputed Claims relating to the Dime Warrants are Allowed Claims times the per share price of Common Equity Interests on a date established by the Bankruptcy Court bears to the market capitalization of all other Common Equity Interests (as determined by the Bankruptcy Court using such same per share price)
• The amount established by the United States Court of Federal Claims in the Anchor Litigation, pursuant to a Final Order, as applied in connection with the Dime Warrant Litigation, times the per share price of Common Equity Interests on a date established by the Bankruptcy Court bears to the market capitalization of all other Common Equity Interests (as determined by the Bankruptcy Court using such same per share price)
• Such other amount as may be agreed upon by the plaintiffs in the Dime Warrant Litigation and the Liquidating Trustee; provided, however, the recovery in connection with the Dime Warrant Litigation will not exceed the lesser of (1), (2), (3) and (4) above,
I contend that this conversion rate is patently improper because it basically converts one share of DIMEQ into one share of WAMUQ and then adds the relative market caps and divides the total back into the improperly constructed DIMEQ market cap. The Debtor’s conversion method inexplicably ignores the conversion rate provided for by the LTW Agreement and further memorialized in an 8-k filed on March 13, 2003. Under the proper conversion method the “Adjusted Litigation Recovery” is divided by the “Merger Adjusted Stock Price” and then further divided by the number of outstanding LTWs. See calculation below.

So what exactly am I saying is the proper conversion rate? To simplify, we basically have to add the relative value of the LTW claims to the market capitalization of WAMUQ (1.7 Billion shares times the market share price of WAMUQ at a date to be determined) and then divide that total back into the value of the LTW claims. Now there are 4 possible amounts to assign as the value of the LTW claims which includes the lesser of the Estimated Claims ($337 million), the final allowed claims determined by the Bankruptcy Court (TBD), the final allowed claims determined by the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (TBD) and any stipulated amount agreed upon by and between the Liquidating Trustee and the LTW Plaintiffs (TBD or N/A).

We know what the highest possible claim amount is for DIMEQ and that would be the estimated Disputed Claims Reserve amount of $337 million. If one assumes that the LTW Plaintiffs don’t agree to less in a stipulated settlement, then the lowest amount that could be assigned to the LTWs would appear to be in the $228 million context. One can arrive at that value by taking the $356 million “pre-grossup” award from the Federal Claims Court (assuming the additional $63 million award is not awarded) plus the $104 million grossup less estimated litigation and issuance expenses of $22 million and that total then multiplied by a 38.757% tax rate (JPM’s estimate) and then reduced by 15% for the 85/15 split with WMI.



This whole exercise is, of course, a moot point if the Court finds that the LTWs constitute Unsubordinated General Unsecured Claims. The Court may also find that the LTW Claims are secured claims in the event that the Plaintiffs prevail on their Equitable Lien via Constructive Trust theory. In any event, whether the LTWs represent Unsubordinated Claims or Equity Interests and whether the Debtors prevail in their use of an improper conversion rate, it is now clear that the LTWs have value. What is also implicit in all of this is that barring any stipulated settlement between the Debtors and the LTW Plaintiffs, the Court will still have to conduct a final claims estimation hearing for the LTWs.

One final point I will make here is that the Plan currently provides that if the LTWs are deemed to be Equity Interests then they are an impaired Class and are not entitled to vote. Under this Plan construct it would apparently foreclose an LTW Holder from appealing the Judge’s decision to the District Court. Since there are many issues involved in the LTW Adversary Proceeding that are appealable and in the event that the Court finds the LTWs to represent Equity Interests, the LTW Holders should be given an election to either accept the treatment provided for under the Plan and to grant the applicable releases or in the alternative should be given an election to reject the treatment under the Plan, grant no releases, and take up any adverse ruling on appeal.
---------

Zitat NASCOW:

Two points of interest in that article
Quote:
What is also implicit in all of this is that barring any stipulated settlement between the Debtors and the LTW Plaintiffs, the Court will still have to conduct a final claims estimation hearing for the LTWs.

One final point I will make here is that the Plan currently provides that if the LTWs are deemed to be Equity Interests then they are an impaired Class and are not entitled to vote. Under this Plan construct it would apparently foreclose an LTW Holder from appealing the Judge’s decision to the District Court. Since there are many issues involved in the LTW Adversary Proceeding that are appealable and in the event that the Court finds the LTWs to represent Equity Interests, the LTW Holders should be given an election to either accept the treatment provided for under the Plan and to grant the applicable releases or in the alternative should be given an election to reject the treatment under the Plan, grant no releases, and take up any adverse ruling on appeal.


Any thoughts?
Zitatende

MfG.L:)

Hallo verehrter Donaufan,

jeder der mich hier kennt weiß doch, daß das doch nur rein als kleiner Ulk gemeint
war und ich Ihnen gegenüber ganz bestimmt nicht den Oberlehrer oder den
allwissenden Korrektor spielen wollte !
Kein Mensch hier würde einen Tippfehler groß anprangern oder Sie deshalb
in die Unwissenheitsecke stellen. Also ganz bestimmt nicht ! Auch in meinen
umfangreicheren Beiträgen passieren mir auch ständig Tipp- oder sonstige Fehler,
welche ich trotz 3 - maligem korrekturlesen erst bemerkte hatte, als der Beitrag
schon unwiderruflich eingestellt war. Und auch ich werde dafür von niemadem hier
deshalb gleich als Blödmann abgestempelt. Sollten Sie das dennoch so aufgefaßt
oder empfunden haben, entschuldige ich mich hier mit in aller Form bei Ihnen !!!!

B.G. u.n.f.U.
Schwarzwälder

bezweifle mal, dass jeder Áktionär so einfach bei Büro Susman anrufen kann u. auch noch irgendwelche Infos bekommt.

Zu den Frage u. Antwort Bogen haben die Herren lange genug Zeit gehabt. Da kommt bei mir der leise Verdacht, dass wir hingehalten werden, damit vorallem die ausländische Aktionäre, die Fristen nicht einhalten können.

Nachdem Dimeq zu behaupten, dass das POR 7 für uns gut sein soll, ist eine Frechheit.
statt null komma nix bekommen wir null komma null.

Soviel meinerseits zum Vertrauen, bin jetzt ehrlich gesagt angepisst u. am überlegen die Seite zu wechseln um die Petition gegen Willingham zu unterschreiben.

Gruß
Dude44

Meine Herren, das erste echt wichtige Ereignis seit tagen und ihr redet imm noch nur Mist statt das zudiskutien.

D Punkt ist doch, welche folgen hat das für uns. Dimeq sind doch Optionen. In welcher rate werden die nunalso getauscht und vor allem zuwelchem Preis? Optionen müssen ja eingelöst werden irgendwie. Folglich, könnte das nicht heissen das Reling hat nahezu keine folgenauf die Commons,da es sich schlichtweg bei zu geringer Recovery nicht lohnen koennte die Optionen zu tauschen?

Sagen wir die Commons könnten knapp einen Dollar erreichen, der Option kostet aber mehr, dann wuerde ja keiner die Option ziehen? Oder Holzweg?

So wie ich es verstehe, sollen die Optionen "zwangsgezogen" werden, also eine direkte Auschüttung in Aktien. Falls es nicht stimmt, bitte korrigieren!

Außerdem weiß keiner, was am Ende für ein Verhältnis herauskommt (auch ein Bestandteil der United Objection)

... ich stehe gerade auf dem Schlauch:

Wieso fallen die P's und die Q's steigen, wenn die DIMEQ jetzt als Equity gelten? Gemäss POR 7 (jaja, ich weiss, kann durch Mary noch geändert werden) müssen die q's (ca. 30% an WMI-Neu) mit den DIMEQ teilen... :) :)

lg, rstud

9294   Motion for Protective Order for Claimants Al Brooks, Todd Baker, Deb Horvath, John McMurray, Tom Casey, and David Schneider Pursuant to Rule 26(c)

www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229120103000000000002.pdf

9295   BNC Certificate of Service re: Notice of Filing of Transcript and of Deadlines Related to Restriction and Redaction for Hearing Held on December 29, 2011 [Docket No. 9293]

www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229120103000000000003.pdf

          §9296   Notice of Agenda of Matters Scheduled for Hearing on January 5, 2012 at 11:30 a.m. (EST)

www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229120103000000000004.pdf

9297   Objection and Reservation of Rights of the Pro Se Shareholder to the Disclosure Statement for the Seventh Amended Joint Plan of Affiliated Debtors Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code as Filed on December 12th

www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229120103000000000001.pdf

Weil die Ausbuchung 100%vom Tisch ist und der Wert jetzt zwischen 0,067 und 0,10 $cent liegt.

Gruss Holzi PS:Positives Denken kann bei Wamu nicht schaden und bewahrt einen vor schnell-Schüssen mitten ins Herz !!

messages.finance.yahoo.com/Stocks_(A_to_Z)/...;frt=2&off=1

Be careful .... Read what XOM posted from the ruling and might explain why commons haven't dropped.

From the Opinion, The Court finds that:
1. The GSA settles that JPMC acquired the Anchor Litigation (AL) by acquiring WMB;
2. The LTWs, by all evidence, were equity and not debt, so there was no creditor claim to the AL recovery, only a right to purchase WMI common;
3. The LTW claims are subordinated to that of common stock; and
4. that WMI did not breach the LTW Agreement that would entitle Holders to receive WMI common stock.


From the ruling:
The LTW Holders finally contend that under section 4.4 of the Amended Warrant Agreement, WMI must assure that the LTW Holders receive the value of the Anchor Litigation. WMI responds that the obligation of the board of directors under section 4.4 is permissive only, not mandatory.
...Therefore, WMI contends that it is not required to make any adjustments to protect the rights of the LTW Holders.

The Court agrees that section 4.4 is permissive, not mandatory, {{{and cannot form the basis for a claim of breach of the Warrant Agreement.}}} This is so particularly where WMI is in a bankruptcy proceeding and is precluded by its fiduciary obligations to the creditors from taking any action to prefer equity holders, such as the LTW Holders.
{{{Therefore, the Court concludes that there has been no breach of the Warrant Agreements that would give rise to a claim in this case.}}}

In this case, the LTW Holders’ claims are based on breach of the Warrant Agreement pursuant to which they are entitled to receive common stock of WMI. Those claims fit squarely within the purview of section 510(b) and must be subordinated.

The LTWs are warrants representing the right to receive common stock of WMI once the Anchor Litigation is resolved. The claim which the LTW Holders assert here is that WMI has breached the Warrant Agreement by failing to assure that they receive a specific value (85% of the Anchor Litigation recovery). The only way that the LTW Holders are entitled to receive that value, however, is by exercising their right to acquire common stock of WMI. Thus, their claims clearly relate to a breach of an agreement to acquire stock in WMI and must be subordinated under section 510(b) to the level of common stock.



If interpreting this correctly, JMW ruled that DIME has no claim against WMI for breach? So how do they get value for their stock if not based on the claim value? I'm asking because I'm not following this as it makes NO SENSE!!

Ich stehe wohl gerade ein wenig auf dem Schlauch... Wie kommt Du auf die 0,067$?
Danke!

*hmmm*

Q 1,25M
H 75 k

Hallo zusammen,

weiß jemand ob es Rückstellung in der Klasse 14 für die Dimeq gab? Falls ja dann müssten ja jetzt die Gelder durch das Wasserfallprinzip in die "unteren" Klassen geld spülen...

Werden die 30% der Commons von der WMI-Neu jetzt zu 15% für die Commons und 15 für die Dimeq?

Ich gehe davon aus das die dimeq jetzt ebenfalls in der Klasse 21 sind... => die Preffered sind von dem Urteil heute weiters nicht betroffen ausser es sollte Rückstellungen gegeben haben die Geld in die unteren Klassen spült... (Wenn es sowas geben sollte, gehe ich davon aus, dass BR sich ein Bein ausreisen wird bevor er uns ein Cent schenkt)

Die Frage die sich mir immer stellt ist warum ist unsere Vertretung mit dem Deal zufrieden? Was versteckt sich hinter dem Deal? Wollen sie uns nur ruhig stellen und den Plan durchwinken und dann uns mit der Keule eine rüberziehen oder wissen sie, dass es nach dem Austritt aus Chapter 11 ein Happy-End geben wird? Fragen über fragen...

schau doch mal was so bis jetzt gepostet wurde ..., z.B.:

#176290

ZItat:
The max upside in this case for DIMEQ that would result from being classified as a Class 12 GUC claimant or an equitable lienholder is about $3.00 per LTW (versus today ~ 65 cents) before post-petition interest if the full $337 million reserve goes to the LTW Holders. If the federal judgment rate is applied to that award for 3.5 years it moves the recovery up to about $3.20. On the downside, if DIMEQ is deemed to be Equity and if the Debtor prevails in applying the improper conversion rate then the worst scenario based on Plan value would put the DIMEQ security between $0.07 and $0.10.

Zitatende

MfG.L:)

Ist der Wert der sich nach den Berechnungen aus PO 7 ergibt wenn er so durchgeht.Da musste dir mal die Berechnungen von Faster und Winner durchschauen.

Gruss Holzi

Bin derzeit noch unterwegs und habe ein paar Probleme, die Texte detailiert durchzuarbeiten. Deswegen vielen Dank an dieser Stelle.

kommen die Dime in die Klasse 21. Die Wamuq also alt commons sind klasse 22. Es müssen sich wohl die Vorzüge verdünnen lassen. Würde auch ie Kurse  erklären.

grüße gumaus