Wamu WKN 893906 News !

...ich vergaß das Problem der Götter ...

MfG.L:)

lieb fragt++++kann mir irgend jemand hier eine info geben was das heute beim hearing ergeben hat ??

A report by the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations detailing the makings of the financial crisis, including Washington Mutual's foray into risky lending, is scheduled to be released this evening. It should follow up on a series of hearings conducted last year by the subcommittee, in which it interviewed regulators and top executives at some of the institutions at the heart of the crisis.

Included in the report will likely be more information about the practices of Seattle thrift WaMu, which became the largest bank to fail in history when it was shut down by regulators on Sept. 25, 2008. The subcommittee grilled former WaMu CEO Kerry Killinger last April, along with other executives and people charged with auditing and regulating the thrift, questioning why poor lending practices were allowed to run rampant.

During last year's hearings, which lasted several weeks, major investment banks were questioned, too. Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank executives were each asked about the development and use of financial instruments, such as credit default swaps and collateralized debt obligations, which allegedly allowed the firms to profit immensely, sometimes at the direct expense of their clients.

The subcommittee has supposedly looked at millions of documents and conducted more than 150 interviews to compile the report. One comment made previously by Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI), who heads the subcommittee, was that the financial crisis was man-made, not the result of market cycles. He has stated shoddy mortgages originated and sold by WaMu and others polluted the financial system, and contributed to the economic downturn. I would expect the report to reflect a similar critical tone.

Later this evening, I'll review the report and post my findings.

KELLY GILBLOM covers banking, finance and residential real estate for the Puget Sound Business Journal. Phone: 206-876-5428 | Email: kgilblom@bizjournals.com | Twitter: KellyGilblom
www.bizjournals.com/seattle/blog/2011/04/...o-be-released.html

www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/...-bailout-20110411?page=2

ein auszug: "In other words, the government lent taxpayer money to the same assholes who caused the crisis, so that they could then lend that money back out on the market virtually risk-free, at an enormous profit."

"mit anderen worten, die regierung hat steuerzahlergeld an die selben arschlöcher verliehen, die für die krise verantwortlich waren, damit diese arschlöcher das geld am markt weiterleihen konten, praktisch risikofrei, und mit einem enormen profit"

es ist bezeichnend, das ein reporter des rolling stone diese erkenntniss gewinnt. immerhin, wenn auch etwas spät, und jetzt fehlt nur noch der finger auf die verbrecher, die mit ihrer beschlagnahmung von wmb die krise ausgelöst haben, dimon, paulson, und die gauner, die sie dabei gedeckt haben, levin, obama usw.

die sogennanten wirtschafts und politikmagazine wie z.b. der spiegel sind noch immer dabei, ihre annoncenrechnungen an die diversen banken zu prüfen, um ja nicht in gefahr zu geraten, diese durch unbotmässige berichterstattung zu verlieren.

der rolling stone würde sie wahrscheinlich ebenfalls als assholes bezeichen, grins.

Short data for Tuesday, April 12, 2011

Symbol Short Volume Short % Short Exempt Volume Total Volume
DIMEQ 556,705 27.66 % 0 2,012,488
WAMKQ 9,000 24.71 % 0 36,420
WAMPQ 469 8.71 % 0 5,387
WAMUQ 677,755 24.27 % 0 2,792,327

Short data for Wednesday, April 13, 2011

Symbol Short Volume Short % Short Exempt Volume Total Volume
DIMEQ 5,900 8.19 % 0 72,056
WAMKQ 5,600 32.47 % 0 17,248
WAMPQ 849 11.34 % 0 7,485
WAMUQ 444,651 24.26 % 0 1,832,542


Quelle:
www.geishababy.com/WaMu/....aspx?SettlementDate=01%2f14%2f2011

"You ever watch soccer, where the guy rolls six times to get a yellow card?"

schlampig übersetzt:" hast du jemals fussball gesehen, wo sich der kerl sechsmal überschlägt, um eine gelbe karte zu erzwingen?"

aus dem artikel von matt taibi im rolling stone.

passt wunderbar auf james dimon und seine "bad loans" von wamu, grins.

Jane Leamy, der US Trustee soll anscheinend auf der Suche nach neuen EC-Mitgliedern sein.  

images.investorshub.advfn.com/images/...muust_%28Large%29.png" style="max-width:560px" />

investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=62028690

Ob da einer wieder das "sinkende Boot" verlassen will oder der UST Bedarf sieht, das EC zusätzlich zu vergrössern?

Lg,
Affliction

wie sie lebt!
Die Verbrecherkinder Jpmorgan und Goldman betruegen die ganze Welt unter dem Deckmantel der Mutter Fed und Vater Fdic der geschaffenen Monopolyverbrecher und Betruegerbank ohne Gegenwert während Goldman und Jpm als Besitzer der Fed agieren
und eigentlich Buergen der Fed und dessen erschaffenen Geldes ohne Gegenwert sein sollten aber selbst pleite sind!

So stuertzt Jpm Lehman und stiehlt Wamu und kauft mit geliehenem Geld der Fed Schnäppchen wie Goldman auch weil ja die Fed entscheidet wem sie Geld leihen und die Fdic entscheidet wer pleite sein soll und wer nicht!

Wer deckt jetzt das Fed Geld wenn die Buergen nix haben ausser Beschiss ,wird Zeit das Ron paul mal aufräumt nach 99 Jahren der unbegrenzten Fed Diktatur ,dem Monopoly und Schneeballmafiadiebstahl und Weltverbrecherlumpenbetrugssystem
auf Kosten vieler ehrlich arbeitender Menschen!

Die Fed Mafia hat ja auch den ersten ,zweiten Weltkrieg finanziert und der Nsdap ueber die Schweiz gewaltig Geld zugeschustert um denen zur Machtergreifung zu helfen ,da ging einiges rueber von US Banken zu Schweizern und dann ins Nsdap Konto!

Das wird verheimlicht wie jeder Betrug der Fed Sippe an der Menschheit!

Omnibus Order Awarding Interim Allowance of Compensation for Services Rendered and for Reimbursement of Expenses
www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229110413000000000013.pdf

Certificate of No Objection Regarding Tenth Monthly Application of Susman Godfrey L.L.P., as Co-Counsel to the Official Committee of Equity Security Holders of Washington Mutual, Inc. et al., for Allowance of Compensation for Services Rendered and Reimbursement of Expenses Incurred for the Period of January 1, 2011 Through January 31, 2011
www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229110413000000000014.pdf

Order Authorizing Interim Fees and Expenses Requested by Pepper Hamilton LLP, in its Notice of Seventh Quarterly Fee Application Request as Co-counsel to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, for the Period October 1, 2010 through January 31, 2011
www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229110413000000000015.pdf

Order Approving Settlement Agreement Between Debtors, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., California Department of Toxic Substances Control, The BKK Joint Defense Group and Certain of That Group's Individual Members
www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229110413000000000016.pdf

Order Granting Admission Pro Hac Vice of Phillip Bentley
www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229110413000000000017.pdf

Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Patricia Astorga to Represent Washington Mutual, Inc., et al.
www.kccllc.net/documents/0812229/0812229110413000000000018.pdf

Starke Quartalszahlen hindern auch JP Morgan nicht, über die nationalen Gefahren höherer Eigenkapitalquoten zu klagen. Dass aber auch noch Kriegsversehrte als Rechtfertigung fürs Geschäft herhalten müssen, ist einzigartig.

Wie gut es JP Morgan  geht, zeigt allein die Ankündigung im Quartalsbericht, dass bis Ende 2012 Aktien im Wert von 15 Mrd. Dollar zurückgekauft werden sollen. Unnötig zu erwähnen, dass auch JP Morgan höhere Eigenkapitalanforderungen für untragbar hält. Verschärfte Regeln, so tönte JP Morgans Vorstand Jamie Dimon Anfang April, könnten den Sargnagel für Institute wie seines darstellen. Für dieses rechnen die Analysten übrigens mit einem Nettogewinn von 20 Mrd. Dollar in diesem Jahr.


www.ftd.de/finanzen/maerkte/marktberichte/...elt/60039090.html

levin.senate.gov/newsroom/supporting/2011/...Crisis_041311.pdf

Senate Investigations Subcommittee Releases Levin-Coburn Report On the Financial Crisis  

WASHINGTON – Concluding a two-year bipartisan investigation, Senator Carl Levin, D-Mich., and Senator Tom Coburn M.D., R-Okla., Chairman and Ranking Republican on the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, today released a 635-page final report (PDF, 6MB) on their inquiry into key causes of the financial crisis.  The report catalogs conflicts of interest, heedless risk-taking and failures of federal oversight that helped push the country into the deepest recession since the Great Depression.

“Using emails, memos and other internal documents, this report tells the inside story of an economic assault that cost millions of Americans their jobs and homes, while wiping out investors, good businesses, and markets,” said Levin. “High risk lending, regulatory failures, inflated credit ratings, and Wall Street firms engaging in massive conflicts of interest, contaminated the U.S. financial system with toxic mortgages and undermined public trust in U.S. markets.  Using their own words in documents subpoenaed by the Subcommittee, the report discloses how financial firms deliberately took advantage of their clients and investors, how credit rating agencies assigned AAA ratings to high risk securities, and how regulators sat on their hands instead of reining in the unsafe and unsound practices all around them.  Rampant conflicts of interest are the threads that run through every chapter of this sordid story.”

“The free market has helped make America great, but it only functions when people deal with each other honestly and transparently.  At the heart of the financial crisis were unresolved, and often undisclosed, conflicts of interest,” said Dr. Coburn.  “Blame for this mess lies everywhere from federal regulators who cast a blind eye, Wall Street bankers who let greed run wild, and members of Congress who failed to provide oversight.”

The Levin-Coburn report expands on evidence gathered at four Subcommittee hearings in April 2010, examining four aspects of the crisis through detailed case studies:  high-risk mortgage lending, using the case of Washington Mutual Bank, a $300 billion thrift that became the largest bank failure in U.S. history; regulatory inaction, focusing on the Office of Thrift Supervision’s failed oversight of Washington Mutual; inflated credit ratings that misled investors, examining the actions of the nation’s two largest credit rating agencies, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s; and the role played by investment banks, focusing primarily on Goldman Sachs, creating and selling structured finance products that foisted billions of dollars of losses on investors, while the bank itself profited from betting against the mortgage market.

New Evidence.  Today’s report presents new facts, new findings and recommendations, with more than 700 new documents totaling over 5,800 pages.  It recounts how Washington Mutual aggressively issued and sold high-risk mortgages to Wall Street, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac, even as its executives predicted a housing bubble that would burst, and offers new detail about how its regulator deferred to the bank’s management.  New documents show how Goldman used net short positions to benefit from the downturn in the mortgage market, and designed, marketed, and sold CDOs in ways that created conflicts of interest with the firm’s clients and at times led to the bank’s profiting from the same products that caused substantial losses for its clients.  Other new information provides additional detail about how credit rating agencies rushed to rate new mortgage-backed securities and collect lucrative rating fees before issuing mass ratings downgrades that shocked the financial markets and triggered a collapse in the value of mortgage related securities.  Over 120 new documents provide insights into how Deutsche Bank contributed to the mortgage mess.

“Our investigation found a financial snake pit rife with greed, conflicts of interest, and wrongdoing,” said Levin.  Among the report’s highlights are the following.

High Risk Lending.  With an eye on short term profits, Washington Mutual launched a strategy of high-risk mortgage lending in early 2005, even as the bank’s own top executives stated that the condition of the housing market “signifies a bubble” with risks that “will come back to haunt us.”  Executives forged ahead despite repeated warnings from inside and outside the bank that the risks were excessive, its lending standards and risk management systems were deficient, and many of its loans were tainted by fraud or prone to early default.  WaMu’s chief credit officer complained at one point that “[a]ny attempts to enforce [a] more disciplined underwriting approach were continuously thwarted by an aggressive, and often times abusive group of Sales employees within the organization.”  From 2003 to 2006, WaMu shifted its loan originations from low risk, fixed rate mortgages, which fell from 64% to 25% of its loan originations, to high risk loans, which jumped from 19% to 55% of its originations.  WaMu and its subprime lender, Long Beach Mortgage, securitized hundreds of billions of dollars in high risk, poor quality, sometimes fraudulent mortgages, at times without full disclosure to investors, weakening U.S. financial markets.  New analysis shows how WaMu sold some of its high risk loans to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and played one off the other to make more money.
Regulatory Failures.  The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), Washington Mutual’s primary regulator, repeatedly failed to correct WaMu’s unsafe and unsound lending practices, despite logging nearly 500 serious deficiencies at the bank over five years, from 2003 to 2008.  New information details the regulator’s deference to bank management and how it used the bank’s short term profits to excuse high risk activities.  Although WaMu recorded increasing problems from its high risk loans, including delinquencies that doubled year after year in its risky Option Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM) portfolio, OTS examiners failed to clamp down on WaMu’s high risk lending.  OTS did not even consider bringing an enforcement action against the bank until it began losing substantial sums in 2008.  OTS also failed until 2008, to lower the bank’s overall high rating or the rating awarded to WaMu’s management, despite the bank’s ongoing failure to correct serious deficiencies.  When the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) advocated taking tougher action, OTS officials not only refused, but impeded FDIC oversight of the bank.  When the New York State Attorney General sued two appraisal firms for colluding with WaMu to inflate property values, OTS took nearly a year to conduct its own investigation and finally recommended taking action -- a week after the bank had failed.  The OTS Director treated WaMu, which was its largest thrift and supplied 15% of the agency’s budget, as a “constituent” and struck an apologetic tone when informing WaMu’s CEO of its decision to take an enforcement action.  When diligent oversight conflicted with OTS officials’ desire to protect their “constituent” and the agency’s own turf, they ignored their oversight responsibilities.
Inflated Credit Ratings.  The Report concludes that the most immediate cause of the financial crisis was the July 2007 mass ratings downgrades by Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s that exposed the risky nature of mortgage-related investments that, just months before, the same firms had deemed to be as safe as Treasury bills.  The result was a collapse in the value of mortgage related securities that devastated investors.  Internal emails show that credit rating agency personnel knew their ratings would not “hold” and delayed imposing tougher ratings criteria to “massage the … numbers to preserve market share.”  Even after they finally adjusted their risk models to reflect the higher risk mortgages being issued, the firms often failed to apply the revised models to existing securities, and helped investment banks rush risky investments to market before tougher rating criteria took effect.  They also continued to pull in lucrative fees of up to $135,000 to rate a mortgage backed security and up to $750,000 to rate a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) – fees that might have been lost if they angered issuers by providing lower ratings.  The mass rating downgrades they finally initiated were not an effort to come clean, but were necessitated by skyrocketing mortgage delinquencies and securities plummeting in value.  In the end, over 90% of the AAA ratings given to mortgage-backed securities in 2006 and 2007 were downgraded to junk status, including 75 out of 75 AAA-rated Long Beach securities issued in 2006.  When sound credit ratings conflicted with collecting profitable fees, credit rating agencies chose the fees.
Investment Banks and Structured Finance.  Investment banks reviewed by the Subcommittee assembled and sold billions of dollars in mortgage-related investments that flooded financial markets with high-risk assets.  They charged $1 to $8 million in fees to construct, underwrite, and market a mortgage-backed security, and $5 to $10 million per CDO.  New documents detail how Deutsche Bank helped assembled a $1.1 billion CDO known as Gemstone 7, stood by as it was filled it with low-quality assets that its top CDO trader referred to as “crap” and “pigs,” and rushed to sell it “before the market falls off a cliff.”  Deutsche Bank lost $4.5 billion when the mortgage market collapsed, but would have lost even more if it had not cut its losses by selling CDOs like Gemstone.  When Goldman Sachs realized the mortgage market was in decline, it took actions to profit from that decline at the expense of its clients.  New documents detail how, in 2007, Goldman’s Structured Products Group twice amassed and profited from large net short positions in mortgage related securities.  At the same time the firm was betting against the mortgage market as a whole, Goldman assembled and aggressively marketed to its clients poor quality CDOs that it actively bet against by taking large short positions in those transactions.  New documents and information detail how Goldman recommended four CDOs, Hudson, Anderson, Timberwolf, and Abacus, to its clients without fully disclosing key information about those products, Goldman’s own market views, or its adverse economic interests.  For example, in Hudson, Goldman told investors that its interests were “aligned” with theirs when, in fact, Goldman held 100% of the short side of the CDO and had adverse interests to the investors, and described Hudson’s assets were “sourced from the Street,” when in fact, Goldman had selected and priced the assets without any third party involvement.  New documents also reveal that, at one point in May 2007, Goldman Sachs unsuccessfully tried to execute a “short squeeze” in the mortgage market so that Goldman could scoop up short positions at artificially depressed prices and profit as the mortgage market declined.  
Recommendations.  The Report offers 19 recommendations to address the conflicts of interest and abuses exposed in the Report.  The recommendations advocate, for example, strong implementation of the new restrictions on proprietary trading and conflicts of interest; and action by the SEC to rank credit rating agencies according to the accuracy of their ratings.  Other recommendations seek to advance low risk mortgages, greater transparency in the marketplace, and more protective capital, liquidity, and loss reserves.

WaMu’s “troubling compensation practices went right to the top,” the panel found. Killinger received a $15 million severance payment in 2008 “when he was asked to leave the bank that failed under his management,” according to the report.

The Seattle-based lender was sold to JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) in September, 2008, as it collapsed. “The activities described in the subcommittee staff’s report obviously took place before we purchased Washington Mutual’s assets,” Joseph Evangelisti, a spokesman for JPMorgan, said yesterday.

WaMu, which had $300 billion of assets and 2,300 branches when it collapsed, began a strategy of emphasizing high-risk loans in 2004, the subcommittee said. The panel found that the bank’s efforts to boost loan volume involved fraud.

“WaMu management was provided with compelling evidence of deficient lending practices in internal e-mails, audit reports, and reviews,” the panel said. “Internal reviews of WaMu’s loan centers, for example, described ‘extensive fraud’ from employees ‘willfully’ circumventing bank policy.”

‘Predatory’ Lending
An internal audit of a Washington Mutual subprime subsidiary in 2005 identified “predatory” lending practices and found that staff sometimes failed to provide proper documentation. The review of early-default cases found that fraud should have been “easily detected,” the panel said.

WaMu officers who had responsibility for loan quality tried to reject some loan applications, and found that their decisions were sometimes overridden, according to the report.

Diane Kosch, a quality-assurance officer in Dublin, California, told the panel about “enormous” pressure to keep up with loan volume. “Often, when she tried to stop the approval of a loan that did not meet quality standards, it would be referred to management and approved anyway.”

WaMu’s mortgages and mortgage-backed securities were among the worst-performing in the industry, the panel found. That prompted some investors to complain.

Buyers Want Answers
David Beck, head of WaMu’s capital markets division, sent an e-mail in November, 2006, to David Schneider, the bank’s home loans president, about defaults and angry investors.

Securities issued by a WaMu subsidiary were “among the worst performing paper in the mkt in 2006,” the e-mail said. “Subordinate buyers want answers.”

Cheryl Feltgen, the chief risk officer in the home-loan division, wrote in an e-mail in February, 2007, that there was “a meltdown in the subprime market.” She recommended the thrift sell off loans, especially Option Adjustable-Rate Mortgages, or an Option ARMs.

“This seems to me to be a great time to sell as many Option ARMs as we possibly can,” she wrote to an executive.

The OTS discovered more than 500 “serious deficiencies” at WaMu from 2004 to 2008, the subcommittee reported.

The agency “failed to take action to force the bank to improve its lending operations and even impeded oversight by the bank’s backup regulator, the FDIC,” the panel said in its report.

William Ruberry, the spokesman for the OTS, which is being phased out under the Dodd-Frank financial reforms, said the agency would have no comment.
www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-14/...r-failed-report-says.html

WaMu’s combination of high-risk loans, substandard lending practices and weak oversight produced hundreds of billions of dollars of poor quality loans that incurred early payment defaults, high rates of delinquency and fraud, according to the report.

FCIC report

The WaMu information in the report released Wednesday aligned with the data from Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, which is released by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in January.

The inquiry report discussed WaMu’s involvement with adjustable rate mortgages and the challenges it faced.

In 2002, Washington Mutual was the second-largest mortgage originator, just ahead of Countrywide. It had offered the option ARM since 1986, and in 2003, as cited by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, the originator conducted a study "to explore what Washington Mutual could do to increase sales of Option ARMs, our most profitable mortgage loan."

The study revealed that many WaMu brokers "felt these loans were 'bad' for customers."

"A lot of (Loan) Consultants don’t believe in it . . . and don’t think [it’s] good for the customer," one member of the subcommittee’s focus group said. "You’re going to have to change the mindset."

Despite these challenges, option ARM originations soared at Washington Mutual from 30 billion in 2003 to 68 billion in 2004, when they were more than half of WaMu’s originations and had become the thrift’s signature adjustable-rate home loan product.

The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) later determined that the thrift likely could not "pay its obligations and meet its operating liquidity needs." The government seized the bank on Thursday, September 25, 2008 — appointing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver. In doing so, many unsecured creditors suffered losses. WaMu’s assets were $307 billion as of June 30, 2008.
www.housingwire.com/2011/04/13/...wamus-poor-lending-practices

Goldman Sachs Accused By Senate Panel Of Misleading Clients, Manipulating Markets

Auszug:
The Levin-Coburn report criticized not only Goldman, but Deutsche Bank, the former Washington Mutual Bank, the U.S. Office of Thrift Supervision and credit rating agencies Moody's and Standard & Poor's.

"We will be referring this matter to the Justice Department and to the SEC," Levin said at the briefing, though he did not elaborate. A spokesman later said, "The subcommittee does not intend to reveal the specifics of any referral."

The report offered 19 recommendations for reform going beyond changes already enacted after the crisis in 2010's Dodd-Frank Wall Street and banking regulation overhaul.

Case studies from the go-go years of the real estate bubble formed the bulk of the report, which said a runaway mortgage securitization machine churned out abusive loans, toxic securities, and big fees for lenders and Wall Street.

It cited internal emails by Wall Street executives that described mortgage-backed securities underlying many collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs, as "crap" and "pigs."

It said Washington Mutual -- which became the largest failed bank in U.S. history in 2008 -- embraced a high-risk home loan strategy in 2005 while its own top executives were warning of a bubble that "will come back to haunt us."

The U.S. Office of Thrift Supervision -- which will be shut down and merged into another agency under 2010's Dodd-Frank regulatory overhaul -- logged 500 serious deficiencies at Washington Mutual from 2003-2008, but no crackdown followed, the report said.

Mass downgrades of mortgage-related investments in July 2007 by Moody's and Standard & Poor's constituted "the most immediate cause of the financial crisis," it said.

weiter unter:
www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/14/...accusations_n_848978.html

investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=62053947

Zitat tdmd:

With regards to the mediation with the EC that everyone is talking about, here is my take:

From the transcript:

having seen the mediation statement that is
sent out when you file a complaint, having recognized that the
debtor is in mediation with the trust-preferreds in connection
with their appeal, having seen that when the equity committee
tried to bypass mediation in the context of their appeal, the
debtor insisting that they should go through the mediation
process, that I think that a mediator during the month of April
to try to mediate our situation would be totally appropriate..

I will note that when the equity committee appealed
the global settlement, they wanted to bypass the mandatory
procedures for mediation, and the debtor refused. The
debtor -- and I wouldn't -- I assume it wouldn't be because
strategically they were trying to slow down the equity
committee in their litigation -- but they actually thought it
made sense to actually have a dialogue with an equity
committee. And I assume the equity committee is asking for
money. So I assume if they have flexibility talking to the
equity committee in a mediation, because they don't think that
that's a waste of estate assets, then they should be talking to
me.

But the idea of foreclosing mediation under these
circumstances, when they're mediating with the trust preferreds
and they're mediating with the equity, and I assume they're
mediating for a reason, which means they're going to offer them
something more than nothing. So the notion is why aren't they
mediating with us. And I do think that the world changed.
They thought they had a clear case

Judge: OK OK (this is when she cut him off)

So I read this OVER AND OVER AGAIN to make sure I understood what was going on during this ordeal. Basically, the mediation process refers to the EC's appeal of the GSA being declared fair and reasonable by the judge. Apparently, (according to Steinberg, but I'd have to research it more as I am no legal eagle) there is a mandatory mediation process before anyone appeals a judge's ruling. The EC wanted to bypass it altogether to make the process quicker. The debtors wanted mediation and according to Steinberg, he thinks it's not because the debtors wanted to slow the EC down in the appeal, but more to see if they could offer the EC something ("something more than nothing" and he "assumes the EC is asking for money") to put things aside and not let it go to the appeals process because the doodoo will really hit the fan. So Steinberg may have let slip what was going on behind closed doors and the judge stopped him in his tracks.

Let's put it together:
1) Mandatory mediation before appeals.
2) Debtors say "hey, let's go to mediation...I'm sure we can work something out before you go to a higher power since you got some solid legal reasoning for your appeal...because the judges fair and reasonable nonsense is appealed, this thing will spiral out of control"
3) Debtors and EC go through mediation and have dialogue, and Steinberg specifically says, they must offering the EC some money because thats the only thing the EC is after.
4) As we know, EC chairman is only holding post-seizure commons at average of .20 cents, so the Debtors must know they can't offer anything less than that TO THE COMMONS, which means preferreds will be taken care of. Why would debtors even have dialogue with EC if they were to offer anything less? EC would just give BR the 2 middle fingers and head to appeals.

THIS MEANS THERE IS MONEY BEING OFFERED TO EC. I can't state it any clearer. That explains the deafening silence from the SG. Insider trading will just be gravy if proven and FJR and claim disallowance is approved. That's why this judge has allowed the EC to stay alive. That's why the UST is still looking for new EC members. That's why BR is demanding PJS numbers through discovery.

It's not IF the commons get money. It's now a matter of HOW MUCH.

AIMHO

ZItatende


MfG.L:)

hab Mir nochmal den Kursverlauf der letzten Jahre angesehen.Normal müßten Wir
bei mindestens 0,5 stehen.Irgendwas ist hier nicht normal.Und kein Anstieg in letzter
Zeit obwohl jetzt gute Eingaben von unserer Seite am Laufen sind.Hä?
Für Mich aber eigentlich ein gutes Zeichen drinzubleiben.

img52.imageshack.us/img52/7827/unbenanntfvm.jpg" style="max-width:560px" alt="" />

 

bei Ariva habe ich schon ein L&S Kurs....(Aber wenn man sich das Handelsvolumen der letzten Tage anschaut, würde es theoretisch durchaus reichen, die Aktie von 19-20Uhr zu handeln, oder sogar für ein paar Tage ganz aussetzen....)

Die dritte Möglichkeit bneben aussergerichtlichem Vegleich und Strafverfahren nach Verlassen der Insolvenz:
Susman verhält sich "angepasst". Schliesslich sind wir am 12.3. enttäuscht worden genau so wie durch Hochberg, gegen alle Fakten.

Und noch etwas geht mir seit einer Weile im Kopf herum:
Vielleicht war Walrath von Anfang gegen den Sonderprüfer, weil sie wusste, dass es Hochberg werden sollte und auch ahnte oder sogar wusste (in dem Sinne, dass sie die Umstände bgenügend kannte, um es sehen zu können), wie etwa der Bericht aussehen würde (oder sollte).

Positiv werten kann man, dass sie Indirekt deutlichst dazu aufgefordert hat, jetzt endlich einmal deutlich zu werden (Von mir mit bewusst wiederholender Diktion formuliert). Das lässt hoffen.

Besser hätte ich gefunden, wenn wir uns nicht auf diese einzige Hoffnung verlassen hätten, sondern selbst etwas getan hätten. Gestört hätte das niemanden, im Gegenteil, es hätte bloss endlich schlafende Hunde geweckt, was Susman einerseits sekundiert hätte und andererseits auch indirekt gezwungen, sich "vernünftig" zu verhalten.

Bei einer publizistischen Aktion unsererseits hätte man einen öffentlichen Vergleich zwischen den veröffentlichten Fakten und Kommentaren und dem, was er unternommen hätte, gehabt, statt sich blind auf ihn verlassen zu müssen.
Eine Art kontrollierender Messlatte, bei der wir hätten mitbestimmen können. Die Kompetenz wäre vorhanden.

Aber vielleicht liegt es in der deutschen Seele, irgend jemandem in Kadavergehorsam blind folgen zu müssen, sei es Sarrazin, Guttenberg oder Susman.


Gruss, Beaulieu sur mer

 

WaMu Hawaii Trips Drove Risk as Regulator Failed, Report Says

April 13, 2011, 9:20 PM EDT

By James Sterngold, Carter Dougherty and Donal Griffin

(For more on the subcommittee’s report, see {EXT2 <GO>})

April 14 (Bloomberg) -- Washington Mutual Inc.,  once the largest U.S. thrift, rewarded bankers for overcharging  customers on subprime mortgages and selling the worst-performing loans  to investors, a U.S. Senate panel concluded.

The lender gave its top producers free trips to  places like Hawaii and the Bahamas in return for increasing mortgage  volume, even as performance of the loans deteriorated, according to the  Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations report on the financial  crisis.

“Loan officers and processors were paid primarily  on volume, not primarily on the quality of their loans, and were paid  more for issuing higher-risk loans,” the panel found. “Loan officers and  mortgage brokers were also paid more when they got borrowers to pay  higher interest rates, even if the borrower qualified for a lower rate  -- a practice that enriched WaMu in the short term, but made defaults  more likely.”

The report of more than 600 pages, released  yesterday, is based on internal documents and testimony from executives  and regulators. The subcommittee concludes that WaMu’s primary  regulator, the Office of Thrift Supervision, identified hundreds of the  lender’s failings without taking effective action and impeded the  Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. from ordering corrective steps.

Kerry Killinger, the former chief executive  officer of WaMu, and another executive were sued by the FDIC last month.  They were accused of taking extreme risks with the bank’s mortgage  portfolio, causing billions of dollars in losses. Barry Kaplan,  Killinger’s attorney, declined to comment yesterday when asked about the  Senate report.

Compensation Practices

WaMu’s “troubling compensation practices went  right to the top,” the panel found. Killinger received a $15 million  severance payment in 2008 “when he was asked to leave the bank that  failed under his management,” according to the report.

The Seattle-based lender was sold to JPMorgan  Chase & Co. in September, 2008, as it collapsed. “The activities  described in the subcommittee staff’s report obviously took place before  we purchased Washington Mutual’s assets,” Joseph Evangelisti, a  spokesman for JPMorgan, said yesterday.

WaMu, which had $300 billion of assets and 2,300  branches when it collapsed, began a strategy of emphasizing high-risk  loans in 2004, the subcommittee said. The panel found that the bank’s  efforts to boost loan volume involved fraud.

“WaMu management was provided with compelling  evidence of deficient lending practices in internal e-mails, audit  reports, and reviews,” the panel said. “Internal reviews of WaMu’s loan  centers, for example, described ‘extensive fraud’ from employees  ‘willfully’ circumventing bank policy.”

‘Predatory’ Lending

An internal audit of a Washington Mutual subprime  subsidiary in 2005 identified “predatory” lending practices and found  that staff sometimes failed to provide proper documentation. The review  of early-default cases found that fraud should have been “easily  detected,” the panel said.

WaMu officers who had responsibility for loan  quality tried to reject some loan applications, and found that their  decisions were sometimes overridden, according to the report.

Diane Kosch, a quality-assurance officer in  Dublin, California, told the panel about “enormous” pressure to keep up  with loan volume. “Often, when she tried to stop the approval of a loan  that did not meet quality standards, it would be referred to management  and approved anyway.”

WaMu’s mortgages and mortgage-backed securities  were among the worst-performing in the industry, the panel found. That  prompted some investors to complain.

Buyers Want Answers

David Beck, head of WaMu’s capital markets  division, sent an e-mail in November, 2006, to David Schneider, the  bank’s home loans president, about defaults and angry investors.

Securities issued by a WaMu subsidiary were  “among the worst performing paper in the mkt in 2006,” the e-mail said.  “Subordinate buyers want answers.”

Cheryl Feltgen, the chief risk officer in the  home-loan division, wrote in an e-mail in February, 2007, that there was  “a meltdown in the subprime market.” She recommended the thrift sell  off loans, especially Option Adjustable-Rate Mortgages, or an Option  ARMs.

“This seems to me to be a great time to sell as many Option ARMs as we possibly can,” she wrote to an executive.

The OTS discovered more than 500 “serious deficiencies” at WaMu from 2004 to 2008, the subcommittee reported.

The agency “failed to take action to force the  bank to improve its lending operations and even impeded oversight by the  bank’s backup regulator, the FDIC,” the panel said in its report.

William Ruberry, the spokesman for the OTS, which  is being phased out under the Dodd-Frank financial reforms, said the  agency would have no comment.

--Editors: Dan Reichl, Peter Eichenbaum

www.businessweek.com/news/2011-04-13/...ailed-report-says.html

 

Als ich letztes Jahr schon diese Kurse gepostet habe wurde ich angegangen...Es wird auch nicht mehr, glaub mir. Letztes Jahr wurde noch die 11 cent als unüberwindbar geschrieben, heute sind es schon 3 cent. Wie die Zeiten sich doch ändern.
Und nochmal zur Wiederholung: Wer sollte es zulassen das jemand über Nacht reich wird???? (vorallem diejenigen die gar nicht die Geschädigten sind und erst eingestiegen sind). So einfach ist Geld verdienen dann doch nicht.

kann sich nicht einer von unseren experten für EC bewerben;)

www.ftd.de/finanzen/maerkte/marktberichte/...elt/60039090.html

und bestimmt nicht Obama...


Schönes Wochenende