Wamu WKN 893906 News !

www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/0,1518,754401,00.html

maybe another smoking gun?

schönen dank für die kommentare, grins.

als erstes werde ich nächste woche bei wmi und fried frank anfragen, wer nun ihr handelsagent ist, und wo ich meine paar aktien, die ich in den abstimmungstopf werfen werde, registrieren lassen kann.

der zweite schritt wird dann sein, westerwelles rücktritt zu beschleunigen, und seinen nachfolger (oder nachfolgerin) von anfang an unter druck zu setzen.

und dazu bitte nur kommentare von demokraten, grins.

......wenn Killinger eine Frau gewesen wäre.....vieleicht......

.....dann muß ich als "Anarchist" ja mein Maul halten....   :-)

Um die derzeit ablaufenden Prozesse im Hintergrund zu verstehen, MUSS man den Fall als Ganzes betrachten. Dazu gehört vor allen Dingen auch die WaMu-Story, die an Ungereimtheiten kaum zu überbieten ist. Eine Zusammenfassung sollte jeder zumindest einmal gelesen haben:
(man kann es außerdem nicht oft genug wiederholen! ... Und einen besonderen Dank an faster, dessen Recherchearbeit hier in großen Teilen mit einfließt) 
 

 

                               

 

Hi Friends,

wem von Euch der seriöse Hedgefondsmanager Frank Scheunert noch nicht so bekannt ist,
der kann hier ein Interview, welches am 3. Aug. 2010 mit ihm geführt wurde, nachlesen.

                                                         ------------------------

Heute steht uns Frank Scheunert, Vorstand der Exchange Investors NV, zum Thema
Investitionsentscheidung Rede und Antwort. Herr Scheunert ist in Deutschland geboren
und lebt seit vier Jahren in Dubai. Als aktiver Kapitalmarktteilnehmer investiert Scheunert
in Unternehmen rund um den Globus.

Herr Scheunert, was waren Ihre Beweggründe für den Standort Dubai und was hat sich
dort seitdem verändert ?

"Ich kam über die Gründung der Dubai Oasis Capital AH nach Dubai. Ausserdem lernte ich am 1. Tag nach Ankunft hier meine Frau kennen und wir haben nun bereits 2 Kinder und
bald 3. Die DOC AG ist ein System- und Wertpapierhandelsanbieter.
(www.dubai-oasis-capital.de)"

Welche Merkmale muss ein Unternehmen vorweisen, damit Sie investieren ?

"Positive Restrukturierung, Grösse, Handelsvolumen, manchmal auch gerne distressed
Kapitalerhöhungen wie Continental, Heijmans und Pirelli Real Estade. Derzeit finde ich
Wilex und IQ Power sehr gut."

Welche Ziele verfolgen Sie im Normalfall bei Investitionsentscheidungen ?

"Maximalen Profit."

Gibt es weltweit eine Region, die Sie derzeit fokussieren oder richten Sie Ihr Augenmerk
eher auf Branchen ?

"Immer temporär unterschiedlich. Derzeit laufen indonesische Bonds und Aktien sehr gut.
Auch Emerging Markets Bonds wie Chile und Indien liefen in den letzten Monaten gut."

Mittlerweile mehren sich die Stimmen, dass der DAX bis Jahrsende die Marke von 7.000
Punkten überschreiten wird. Welche Einschätzung vertreten Sie ?

"Ich glaub` es auch fast. Insbesondere in den Bondmärkten ist derzeit eine immense
Liquidität zu erkennen. Daher glaube ich, fließt alsbald auch wieder vermehrt Kapital in
die Aktienmärkte, obwohl die Handelsliquidität merklich nachläßt."

Herr Scheunert, wir danken für das Gespräch.


Quelle: www.kapitalerhoehungen.de/Exklusive-Interviews/...chance-Investors-NV


Frank Scheunert
Hedge-Fonds-Manager

Tel. +971-502580129
E-Mail: frank-scheunert@web.de

Durch den Seitenwechsel Rosens im Dezember 2009 wurde das EC geboren. Eine vor Gericht eigenständige und rechtliche Partei, die vom Trustee und Richterin ins Leben gerufen wurde und die Interessen aller Aktionäre vertritt. Auch diese Partei weiß um die Hintergründe zum Fall, denn seit der Stunde "Null" sind engagierte Aktionäre mit dabei. Bestand das EC zu Beginn mehrheitlich aus diesen Aktionären, erkennen wir, dass sich heute, nach mehr als einem Jahr ein "harter Kern" zeigt, der aus dem erfahrenen Michael Willingham in der Zusammenarbeit mit dem Büro Susman & Godfrey und ebenso dem Analystenbüro Solomon besteht.

Und hier sehe ich auch den springenden Punkt! Willingham, der sehr gute Erfahrungen in Chapter11-Fällen (gleichbedeutend mit Ausbuchungsfällen) hat, arbeitet mit einem erfahrenen Berater und Analysten zusammen und findet vor Gericht durch Susman eine sehr gute Vertretung. Dieser "Verbund" verspricht einen interessanten Verlauf des Falles...einen Verlauf, den wir bisher noch gar nicht erlebt haben. Denn es geht immer noch darum, nach dem Chapter11-Prinzip mit den VERBLIEBENEN WERTEN eine WMI zu reorganisieren!??? Sehr merkwürdig. Denn der WaMu Fall läuft ja gerade auf einer ganz anderen Schiene.
Also dürfte auch klar sein, das in der Zeit, die vor dem Konkursgericht verbracht wird, der eigentliche und spannendere Fall gar nicht behandelt wird. Zumindest nicht vordergründig!
Denn es dürfte genau so klar sein, dass Willingham keine Handschellen an hat, durch die er JPM nicht ans Leder könnte. "Under Seal" bedeutet NICHT, dass die berühmten "smoking guns" vernichtet wurden. Es geht hier einzig und alleine darum, die Konkursordnung am Leben zu erhalten und den Fall nicht entgleisen zu lassen. Hier werden keine Beweismittel versagt. Jeder der Parteien weiß haargenau, was die Stunde geschlagen hat. Und von besiegtem EC oder Passivität Solomons oder Susmans kann keine Rede sein.
Der WaMu Fall kann nur durch zwei Möglichkeiten unter dem Teppich bleiben. Ungerechtigkeit oder Korruption!
1. Ungerechtigkeit: Manipulativ herbeigeführte Gerichtsurteile, die Bananenaktionen zur Folge haben könnten, oder
2. Korruption: Die Aktionäre werden abgefunden, was mit einer Bestechung der Aktionäre gleichzusetzen ist (das sollte uns klar sein!).

Bei der dritten Möglichkeit (3.) wird der Fall öffentlich aufgerollt. Und da wird nicht nur JPM ins Schwitzen kommen...ich halte diese Möglichkeit für so gefährlich (das könnte sogar der schwerste Schlag in der Amerikanischen Wirtschaftsgeschichte bedeuten), dass diese nie zu ende kommen wird. Diese Gefahr wird absolut sicher finanziell und manipulativ verhindert werden...wo wir wieder bei den Punkten 1. und 2. wären.

Ich persönlich mache mir keine Sorgen wegen Rosen. Selbst wenn sein jetziger PoR von Mary bestätigt wird, sehe ich nicht, dass der Fall WaMu gleichzeitig damit beendet ist. Dazu sind mir unsere Jungs definitiv viel zu still!! Obwohl sie in der Konkursschiene recht gut aufgestellt und unterwegs sind, halte ich das, was wir öffentlich sehen als die Spitze eines gewaltigen Berges, der in seiner Gesamtheit NOCH nicht gezeigt wird (warum auch immer). Aber dass dieser Berg existiert ist sicher..und es wird (viel) Geld kosten, um diesen bedeckt zu halten (grins).
Und dieser Trumpf IST in der Hand unseres ECs

Also ich schlafe um so ruhiger, je länger der Fall dauert,

union

allnewshype.com/wamu-sweetheart-deal-with-fdic/

The story of the Fed’s efforts to rescue giant banks like Merrill Lynch, Citigroup and Washington Mutual from the consequences of reckless lending and investments is already well known. The central bank released detailed information in December about the emergency programs it created to pump billions of dollars into those banks.

But the Fed fought long and hard to preserve the secrecy of transactions at the discount window, its oldest and most inclusive lending program. The grudging release of the data Thursday, in a format that impeded analysis, came only after a series of federal courts ruled in favor of lawsuits brought by Bloomberg News and Fox News.

The long list of borrowers, provided in the form of a daily loan register, gives a striking impression of a crisis spreading to every last corner of the financial system.

By late October 2008, the volume of outstanding loans topped $100 billion, with several dozen banks borrowing each day.

Some banks borrowed minimal amounts to test the process in case things got worse. For example, First City Bank in Fort Walton Beach, Fla., borrowed just $1,000 in October 2008 and repaid the money the next day.

“Our regulators encouraged us to do it,” the bank’s president, Robert E. Bennett Jr., said.

Other banks were already struggling to survive. Pacific National Bank of San Francisco borrowed 125 times from February 2008 to February 2009. The bank was closed by regulators in October 2009.

Borrowing from the discount window, even on a confidential basis, has long been viewed as a sign of weakness, to be avoided if at all possible. From 2003 to 2006, the Fed lent an average of less than $50 million each week.

By the summer of 2007, however, the Fed was increasingly concerned that banks were shunning necessary help. In August, officials cut the cost of borrowing from the discount window by half a percentage point. Then they arranged for four of the nation’s largest banks — Bank of America, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase and Wachovia — to take what were described as symbolic loans of $500 million each.

The records released Thursday show that JPMorgan and Wachovia returned most of the money the next day. Bank of America and Citigroup, already showing signs of the problems they still face, kept the money for a month.

Perhaps the most surprising revelation in Thursday’s documents was that foreign banks quickly became the largest and most frequent borrowers. On Sept. 15, 2008, the day that Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, the Austrian bank Erste Group borrowed $4 billion. By the end of that week banks from Spain, France and Japan had also borrowed billions.

An analysis of discount window lending from February 2008 to February 2009 shows that the vast majority of the loan volume went to foreign institutions.

Donald L. Kohn, the Fed’s vice chairman during the crisis, said that many foreign banks needed dollars to meet their financial obligations. The Fed arranged swaps with central banks in other countries to provide dollars, but the flow was insufficient.

“They not only borrowed dollars from their central banks, but they needed to borrow dollars from us as well,” said Mr. Kohn, now a fellow at the Brookings Institution.

Dexia was one of the most frequent and prolific borrowers.

By October 2008, the company’s American subsidiary was regularly visiting the discount window to renew what amounted to a line of credit that eventually reached into the tens of billions. The company continued to borrow from the Fed through November 2009, taking more than 100 short-term loans.

Dexia, which specialized in lending to municipalities, made the nearly fatal mistake of buying an American company that insured bonds — including subprime mortgage bonds. The governments of France, Belgium and Luxembourg invested about $9.2 billion to stabilize the company in 2008.

Ulrike Pommee, a spokeswoman for the company, described the information released Thursday as “backward-looking,” and said the bank had been open about its need for help.

“Dexia was one of the banks most dependent on central banks,” Ms. Pommee said in an e-mail. “The Fed played its role as central banker, providing liquidity to banks that needed it.”

The Arab Banking Corporation, partly owned by the Central Bank of Libya, was another frequent visitor, taking more than two dozen short-term loans of several hundred million dollars each.

“It is incomprehensible to me that while credit-worthy small businesses in Vermont and throughout the country could not receive affordable loans, the Federal Reserve was providing tens of billions of dollars in credit,” Senator Bernie Sanders, Independent of Vermont, wrote in a letter sent Thursday to the Fed chairman, Ben S. Bernanke, and other government officials.

The data also provided new details on the struggles of the largest banks.

Goldman Sachs, which has said that it borrowed from the window only as a test, took five loans of $1 million to $50 million between September 2008 and January 2010.

JPMorgan Chase, which lately has insisted that it did not need government aid during the crisis, also took discount window loans on several occasions, including a $3.5 billion loan in January 2008 on a day that it announced disappointing earnings.

The records show that several banks that failed or were forced into mergers borrowed heavily as problems deepened, including Wachovia, which is now part of Wells Fargo, and Washington Mutual, which is now part of JPMorgan Chase.

The Fed provided the data to reporters Thursday in the form of thousands of pages of electronic documents, loaded on a compact disc and distributed by hand.

Bankers have expressed concerns about the release of the discount window data, saying that the prospect of publicity will deter future borrowing.

“I think it will make it harder for people to use the discount window in the future,” Jamie Dimon, chief executive of JPMorgan Chase, said Wednesday.

Rob Gebeloff and Janet Roberts contributed from New York
livinglies.wordpress.com/

Union eine gute Analyse.....buenisimo...exelente
Hoffe das fast...Schweigen unseres ECs...Susman...Solomon ist positiv.
Rosen wurde auch einige Zeit sehr gelobt.Nun wissen wir welch ein Verb...er diese Person ist.
                                                   Alt+Neu Aktionaer  Silverjohn aus Ecuador/Salinas.

Let’s assume the ONLY thing that CAN be rationally assumed at this juncture: that the reason for setting the confirmation hearing date back a month was to give Rosen more than adequate time to extract every single bit of relevant asset related information contained in PJ Solomon’s noodle. And in doing so, let’s further assume that (as to Rosen) whatever PJ Solomon knows totally trumps any concern about insider trading or the likelihood that the appeal will come to fruition; and that’s because, in wanting to know what Solomon knows, Rosen protects HIMSELF AND HIS FIRM from a charge of bankruptcy fraud. In other words, PJ Solomon is Rosen’s ‘One Last River to Cross’, so to speak before the consummation of an otherwise ‘epic’, if not highly problematic crime. And strangely enough, SG’s recent actions (or the lack thereof) seem to nicely dovetail into Rosen’s now perceived concerns, in that SG has not, to date, opposed Rosen’s efforts in this regard; indeed, for all we know, discovery may already be underway, despite the readily available assertion of attorney-client privilege (which we’ve not seen), nor attorney work product defenses (which, again, we have not seen asserted) which could surely be relied upon to at least slow down, if not entirely bring to a screeching halt Rosen’s efforts in this regard).

However, let’s forget about all that; and for the sake of this very brief analysis, let’s stack the deck completely in Rosen’s favor and see where it takes us … just for fun/. Let’s assume that Rosen does everything short of water-boarding Solomon to extract everything he knows about WAMU’s assets. And let’s also assume that SG files no objections to that discovery. I’d respectfully suggest that there’s ONLY one conclusion which could be reached to explain such behavior; such inaction on the part of an otherwise highly-motivated (and thoroughly INCORRUPTIBLE SG … and I certainly believe them to be exactly that). And that’s that Solomon doesn’t possess the ‘bombshell’ … but that it is possessed by SOMEONE ELSE; someone yet unidentified, and thus wholly beyond the prying reach of Rosen’s discovery. Someone who doesn’t merely know about a bombshell, but is, in fact, the bombshell itself.

Yesterday, Mordicai hit on it by saying: “In the meantime [SG] kept their valuation information secret so they could go about getting interested buyers or capital, so they could create a workable alternative por. The senior note holders have to be paid off someway or another , before the litigation against fdic and jpm could ever continue imho” …

As indicated, I dug into my archives to find a very interesting post from a wonderful contributor, Patience360, who wrote, on this very board, way back on December 27th, the following:

"NOLs, EC Knows It Fully Well pt. 1 27-Dec-10 05:05 pm
There is something people on this board largely ignored or paid no attention to. There is a little “secret” I was hesitate to tell before. When I wrote the post “Trial!!!” (11/30) in which the first half of the post was based on Susman October billing statement, I left out one little intriguing item from the billing on purpose. I noticed people who read the billing made no mention of that “item” at all, which made me quite perplexed at the time.

To call it a “little secret” is a stretch. It’s in the open and on the record. On Susman October billing statement, there is a line item dated on October 20th, recording Mr. Seth Ard had a 90 minutes conversation with A. Sole regarding “marketing reorganized company” (SS Oct. Billing Statement, pdf. p. 25). Above the line item, there is another line item “reviewing latest plan and settlement”. It’s clear the “latest plan” was referred to POR v.6; and since the “settlement” can mean many things and we got burnt by speculating on its meaning so many times before, we can toss it aside in this discussion. However, “marketing reorganized company”, what’s that about? If, per the GSA/POR, all equities are supposed to be cancelled and will have no role in the reorganized WMI, so why equity attorneys took hours to even talk about “marketing” the reorganized company among themselves? Besides, EC legal counsel is not the debtors’ marketing consultant after all.
The reason that I didn’t raise the issue earlier was I didn’t want to get people hyped up unnecessarily and for the wrong reasons (regarding our prospects in WMRRC) but only have our hope crashed if things do not turn out our way later. More importantly, I needed to see further evidence to clarify or re-enforce my thinking. Of course, I could be totally wrong in my reading so I remained salient on the information. Even now, I still urge caution against reading too much into the information other than a routine event of discussing the debtors’ marketing plan among our lawyers in order to better understand the value of reorganized company. In a fuller context we are now aware of, it’s most likely that (Ard-Sole) discussion was about the likelihood of “marketing (or perhaps selling) reorganized company” (no matter who owns it) for valuation purpose, and its potential implication to the overall case.

No matter what, I think EC has laid its eyes on reorganized WMI long ago, and knows the inner workings of NOL tax attributes and their potential values all along. Both PJS and EC Chairman Mr. Willingham are forensic accountants. They had cooperated in Mirant and other bankruptcy cases in the past. They understand, in my view, the most valuable asset of reorganized WMI will be its tax attributes that can yield a potentially astonishing amount of future tax benefits. There is no way for professionals like PJS, Willingham, and EC legal experts to overlook the potential tax benefits of NOL carry forwards. I think they knew this issue fully well even before debtors’ motion to abandon and Tricadia motions."

As indicaed, I tip my hat (again) to Mordicai ... and especially to Patience360, who may have well written the single greatest post in the entire history of iHub. IMO: This is the route that SG has taken. And this is why everyone has been stunned into respectful silence.

Lastly, as I tried to indicate yesterday, For me, the Black Horse motion was the most compelling document that I’ve read to date in these entire proceedings. Morever, the lawyer that defended the positions contained in that document was far and away the most most eloquent (and knowledgeable) speaker to ever have taken the microphone in this case of pompous windbags and air-hogs. Think about it if you will. Re-read it if you must. Fair, scholarly, concise and straight-ahead, the Black Horse motion was written, not so much as what a CREDITOR would write (stay with me on this now), but what a PROTECTOR, or indeed a potential SUITOR,(of what WMI COULD become – with the proper PARTNER, of course) would say. Is there anyone who could not imagine a better match then Black Horse in the traces, providing transport to all the places that a vengeful WMI2 might want to go?

Hopefully, all this will address those at Y who cringe at my unsupported opinions.

William from IHUB Another great post!      3-Apr-11 10:53 am     william48 Share Sunday, April 03, 2011 9:37:44 AM
Re: None Post # of 283845
Come on Folks; isn't it now obvious? SG has found a buyer for the NOLs, and has communicated that fact to TPS, Black Horse (who probably already knows who that buyer is ... hint: it's a horse), ANICO and LTW. Thus the stand-down and the communication black-out. And for good measure, SG has no doubt communicated that fact to Rosen.

ich zitiere:
"jeden Fall   e t w a s   an alle Klassen -vielleicht auch nach dem Wasserfallprinzip oben mehr unten prozentual weniger-, bezahlt werden wird (J.M.W. hatte ja wohl schon mehrfach betont, daß  a l l e  etwas bekommen sollen"

so ,wie ich den etwas unlogisch pushenden supersportwagen schon des öfteren aufgefordert habe ,diese aussage mit einem link oder einer quelle zu belegen, erwarte ich das gleiche von ihnen.
obwohl ich wert darauf lege, ihre sonst in der regel  excellenten postings (frauenwitze ausgenommen) in keinster weise mit denen des users veyron zu vergleichen.
lg hsr

Briefly, the seller of securities is required to disclose the underwriting standards used to make the mortgage loans in the portfolio of the RMBS. It is a crime to fail to make statements necessary to make the statements made not misleading, with the requisite mens rea. The offering materials for the issuance of real estate mortgage-backed securities do not disclose estimates of the number and amount of mortgages that do not meet the standards, even though that information was available, and was material.

The FDIC complaint focuses on the loans retained in the WaMu portfolio. Those loans were a basket of trouble, with enormous losses. But at the same time WaMu was selling loans into securitizations, creating real estate mortgage-backed securities. This was done through its Long Beach Mortgage Company subsidiary, where the RMBSs were sold by Goldman Sachs, among others. Senator Levin’s memorandum discusses the involvement of Goldman Sachs with WaMu in some detail.

WaMu also sold some mortgages it originated into RMBS deals. For example, the offering materials for WMALT Series 2006-AR10, sold in December, 2006, say that Washington Mutual Bank originated about 65.9% of the loans, approximately $328 million. The offering materials describe the due diligence on the mortgages on page S-27, saying that the WaMu credit risk oversight department conducted the due diligence.

The FDIC complaint shows how hollow that assurance is. It says that the risk management people at WaMu repeatedly warned top management about bad lending practices. For example, in 2005 management was told that their models didn’t incorporate “payment shock” (sudden increases in interest rates on existing loans from resets of interest and principal). Their systems were not set up to handle risky loans. They were told that the housing market was “overheated”, a polite term for bubble. They were told they needed to “reduce policy exceptions”, which is apparently their practice of making loans that didn’t meet underwriting standards. They were told that the sales force was overly aggressive.

That stream of information and warnings continued almost until WaMu failed. Upper management was told that the entire risk management operation was inadequate and unsupported. Upper management was repeatedly warned about dangerous lending practices, weak underwriting, lack of adequate controls over origination, and inadequate fraud detection systems. All this is reinforced by information gathered by Senator Levin.

The FDIC complaint makes it perfectly clear that upper management knew that the origination process was in bad shape, and that they continued to push for more loans anyway. This is from a Strategic Direction memorandum from top management in 2006:

“Our plans for the next three years include reducing interest-rate risk and replacing that risk with greater credit risk….” He explained his motivation: “Wall Street appears to assign higher P/Es to companies embracing credit risk and penalizes companies with higher interest-rate and operating risks.”

Neither Bharara nor Durkan is doing anything, and the statute of limitations is running out. Surely there is something to investigate. Surely the FDIC will give them free access to the files of WaMu and help them find the good stuff. Their refusal to investigate must be part of the Great Muddle Through Plan to salvage banksters from both financial and personal responsibility for the Great Crash, and let them get back to business as usual with their reputations and political power intact. And as Doonesbury shows us, their values.
firedoglake.com/2011/04/03/...-officials-of-washington-mutual/

MARY sagte dies, daß alle Klassen was bekommen sollen.

Verstehe doch das endlich hotstockrunner und beleidige mich nicht, wenn jemand Scheld und Heme bekommen soll, dann Pfandi+Cruzi !!! HA HA HA

Aber jetzt:

zum angeblichen Verkauf des NOLs = 17 MRD. sprach ja MARY den Stammaktionären zu und dies sind so 5,5 MRD. wert.
Insgesamt handelt sich ja um insgesamt 32 MRD NOLs, also kommen noch später was hinzu.

GUTE NACHT und auf steigende KURSE

Habe in meinen Archiven gesucht und leider in der schnelle nichts gefunden - wg. Quelle

Nach meiner Erinnerung, war es bei einem Hearing in 2009.
Ab März 2010 habe ich einiges durchgelesen.

Die Frage ist aber immer wieder:
was meinte Mary damit?
Wo ist die Grenze?
Meint Sie alle Klassen hört es auf bei Class16, oder Class 20, oder meinte sie wirklich alle - d.h. inkl. Commons.......

Fragen über Fragen......
***************************************

@ pjönjang:"The Fed provided the data to reporters Thursday in the form of thousands of pages of electronic documents, loaded on a compact disc and distributed by hand."
Ein Leckerbissern für Susman. Es geht aufwärts.
In der Ruhe liegt die Kraft.
Guten Start in die neue Woche. Warten auf den 13. bei susman und den 14. beim 25.
LG jopel

....es könnten ja wieder die Grillparties und walewatching-Aktionen sein......

 

How a big US bank laundered billions from Mexico's murderous drug gangs

As the violence spread, billions of dollars of cartel cash began to seep into the global financial system. But a special investigation by the Observer reveals how the increasingly frantic warnings of one London whistleblower were ignored

www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/03/us-bank-mexico-drug-gangs

(Reuters) - JPMorgan Chase & Co (JPM.N) is in settlement talks with the SEC to end a probe into how the investment bank marketed a deal involving subprime mortgages in 2007, according to the Financial Times.

A settlement between JPMorgan and the Securities and Exchange Commission could be reached within weeks, the paper said.

The SEC declined to comment on the report, while representatives of JPMorgan could not be reached for comment.

The 2007 deal, called "Squared," was a collateralized debt obligation, or CDO. CDOs are complex financial instruments that have been blamed for worsening the global financial crisis in 2008.

The SEC investigation centered around whether JPMorgan adequately disclosed to investors that a hedge fund, Magnetar, helped to select assets for the deal while betting against parts of it.

(Reporting by Nick Carey; editing by Mohammad Zargham)


www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/02/...mp;feedName=businessNews

das die Amis unter sich bleiben

www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/0,1518,754794,00.html

Guten Wochenstart

Glückauf

haaallo!?

bestanden

EINSTAND !!!!!

board und der Rest hat sich verpisst? Würde mich nicht wundern - Börse halt...alles Schwätzer - auch Pfanneköke..