Patriot Scientific der Highflyer 2006

wenn das alles Käufe sind , ist das aber sher optimistisch oder ???

Die Käufe im November 2008 waren jedenfalls günstig.
Unter der Voraussetzung, dass die Käufer etwas positives erwarten.

Nach der Verhandlung in Texas, die nicht das erwartete Ergebnis brachte, wurde über den Fall Stillschweigen vereinbart (confident). Nunmehr hat Judge (Richter) Folcom verraten, was bisher nicht bekannt war: Der Tx-case is pending (schwebend; anhängig); d. h. er ist nicht abgeschlossen, man wartet auf etwas, um dann zu entscheiden.
Vermutlich auf die USPTO-Reexamination Entscheidung. Ist die positiv für PTSC, geht m. E. die Post ab.
siehe: agoracom.com/ir/patriot/messages/1019164#message
und folgende

@ neureich .... danke ....

wie ich auch schon sagte .....
1. wenn die reax. positiv sein sollte, denke ich, dass wieder ein hype entsteht, in dem man sehr viel geld verdienen kann....
2. wenn reax. negativ ..... dann ist ehh alles weg.

aber ich denke (und hoffe) eine positive entscheidung ...... dafür hab ich noch die kriegskasse etwas gefüllt (nur 3K) aber ich denke .... wenn ich an dem tag, wo eine positive entscheidung gefallen ist, eine order zum limit 0,15 eingebe habe ich nach ausführung nochmal 20000 .....
dann denke ich wird es ruckzuck auf 0,40 - 0,60 gehen.........
dann kann man immer noch mal kasse machen ........
herz...was willste mehr !
die restlichen 90% der shares halte ich dann.......und gebe die erst wieder ab 1,50 her .......
oder 5,10 ?????
naja...schaun mer mal ....... wenn net dann net ......

genau das würde mir aus der Seele sprechen und mir ein ruhiges Polster für die Zukunft bescheren

ich denke mal ......
du wirst dir sicher deine eigenen gedanken machen ......aber ich denke,
das die vergangenen einnahmen in millionenhöhe nicht aufgrund von purem nichts
getätigt wurden .....
vermutlich kommt da bald was ganz dickes ......

bin auch optimistsch gestimmt

In the face of overwhelming authority supporting TPL’s position, Acer’s Opposition requests that the Court ignore the general rule requiring production of its witnesses in this district by arguing that the motion is premature, that there was an insufficient meet-and-confer, and that the motion somehow seeks an advisory opinion. These arguments should be rejected. The facts demonstrate that the parties have met and conferred and repeatedly represented to the Court that the parties disagree as to where Acer’s foreign witnesses should be produced for deposition. In the November 7, 2008 Case Management Conference, Judge Fogel recognized the ripeness of this dispute and ordered the parties to seek this Court’s assistance in resolving the issue before the next CMC, scheduled for December 19, 2008. This issue is properly before this Court at this time and should be resolved now instead of waiting until each deposition is noticed. Further, Acer’s unsubstantiated allegations of burden, inefficiency, and cost do not rise to level of undue hardship under the law that justifies a deviation from the general rule of this district. Because Acer has failed to dispute the general rule of this district or demonstrate any undue hardship, the Court should compel Plaintiffs to bring their witnesses to this district, at their own cost, for deposition and trial testimony.
A. TPL’s Motion to Compel Addresses a Ripe Dispute. Acer’s leading argument in its Opposition is that “Defendants’ Motion to Compel is premature because no depositions have been noticed.” Opp. at 2:11. Acer bases this argument on the incorrect notions “that there is no dispute as to the production of any specific witness for Case 5:08-cv-00877-JF Document 64 Filed 12/05/2008 deposition at any location” and that TPL “failed to meet and confer with Plaintiffs.” Id. at 2:24-
25 & 3:8-19. The facts demonstrate that there is a undeniable dispute between the parties regarding where Acer’s foreign witnesses should be deposed and that this issue is ripe for this Court’s adjudication, as Judge Fogel recognized by ordering the parties to have the issue resolved now — before the case management conference scheduled for December 19. As a preliminary issue, Acer admits that the parties have met and conferred on this topic in preparing the Parties’ Joint Case Management Statement. Opp. at 3:9-10; see also Declaration
of Harold H. Davis in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition at ¶¶ 2-3 (“Defendants’ Counsel generally raised the issue regarding the place of deposition for Acer Inc.’s Taiwanese employees…Counsel for plaintiffs declined to enter into…an agreement.”). As evidenced by the Case Management Statements filed on July 18, 2008, and again on November 5, 2008, the parties did not reach an agreement and Acer has consistently maintained that it will not bring its witnesses to this district for deposition. Docket No. 42 at 5:7-12 & Docket No. 48 at 5:25-6:4 (“Defendants contend that, having selected the forum in the Northern District of California, Plaintiffs should be required to produce their employees for deposition and trial in this District. Plaintiffs contend that foreign witnesses should be deposed where they reside or work.”). Acer’s suggestion that this meet-andconfer is somehow insufficient because it allegedly was conducted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) rather than explicitly under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 is nothing more than a transparent attempt to elevate form over substance. Secondly, despite Acer’s insistence that there is no actual dispute, the parties have previously represented, and the Court has recognized, that there is a real dispute that needs to be resolved. On two occasions, the parties have represented to this Court in their Joint Case Management Statements that they have a dispute regarding the production of foreign witnesses for depositions. Id. In fact, Acer joined TPL in stating to the Court: “The parties anticipate that motion practice may be required to resolve this issue before depositions of Acer witnesses are conducted.” Docket No. 48 at 6:2-4. At the November 7, 2008 Case Management Conference, TPL’s counsel (Mr. Cooper) re-raised this issue before Judge Fogel and described the parties as being “fundamentally in disagreement.” Fisher Reply Decl. Exh. A [11/7/08 Hearing Tr. Excerpt] at 4:12-24.1 Recognizing the ripeness of this dispute, Judge Fogel responded: “So that needs to get resolved. That would actually go to the magistrate judge, Judge Lloyd.” Id. at 5:1-2. Judge Fogel then recommended the parties contact Magistrate Judge Lloyd’s chambers to request a hearing date prior to the December 19, 2008 Case Management Conference and “represent to them that I [Judge Fogel] asked for that accommodation.” Id. at 6:8-11. Judge Fogel then concluded: “And then we’ll know what the outcome of this is at that point.” Id. at 6:11-13. In light of Judge Fogel’s request to know the outcome of this dispute by the December 19, 2008 Case Management Conference, Acer’s claim that “this Court is free to hold that the current motion is premature and improper” (Opp. at 4:14-15) contravenes Judge Fogel’s instruction and ignores reality. Acer’s sole legal citation in support of its argument that this dispute is premature, Bermudez v. Duenas, is inapposite because that case addresses a motion to compel in the context of production of documents. 936 F.2d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 1991). The movant in Bermudez initially failed to specify what relief he was seeking, contributing to the Court’s finding that his motion was premature. Id. Here, the opposite is true. The dispute has been crystallized on multiple occasions, and TPL requests specific relief—an order that Acer be compelled to produce its witnesses in this judicial district for their depositions and trial testimony. Bermudez does not address the issue of depositions and where they should occur. To the extent Acer is asserting that there is no dispute regarding any specific Acer witnesses, this is untrue as well. As Acer recognizes, “[a]ll Acer Inc. employees disclosed pursuant to each Party’s Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosures, 17 altogether, work and reside in Taiwan.” Opp. at 5:20-21. In addition, 2 witnesses disclosed in the Parties’ respective Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosures work and reside in South Dakota while 4 Gateway employees work in Irvine, CA. See Davis Decl. Exhs. 2 & 3. At a minimum, the parties disagree about where these 23 Acer witnesses should be deposed. Acer’s opposition confirms that this issue is in dispute and that it 1 The 11/7/08 CMC transcript attached as Exhibit A to the Fisher Reply Decl. mis-identifies the speaker as Acer counsel (Mr. Walker) when the speaker was actually TPL counsel, Mr. Cooper. “Fisher Reply Decl.” refers to the Declaration of Jeffrey M. Fisher in support of TPL’s Reply to Acer’s Opposition to TPL’s Motion to Compel, filed concurrently herewith. remains Acer’s position that all of these depositions should be taken at each employee’s respective place of work, not in the district of the forum in which Acer chose to file this litigation. Opp. at 7:11-17 (“[A]ll Acer Inc. employees and/or representatives would be deposed in Taipei, Taiwan …. Gateway employees and/or representatives would be deposed in Irvine, California or North Sioux City, South Dakota.”). Finally, if Acer’s proposal is taken to its logical conclusion, Acer would essentially demand TPL to notice 23 depositions for the 23 Acer witnesses identified in each party’s Initial Disclosures, and then file separate motions to compel regarding each deposition.2 This attempt to circumvent the general rule of this Court requiring plaintiffs to produce its witnesses in its chosen forum contradicts the mandate of judicial economy. As Judge Fogel recognized by instructing the parties to raise this issue with this Court for resolution now – at the outset of the case – it is far more efficient for the court to resolve this issue now rather than having to resolve the issue each time a witness is noticed. Furthermore, as recognized by Judge Fogel’s order that this issue be resolved before the case management conference on December 19, issues and timing addressed at that CMC may be impacted by the resolution of this matter.
B. Acer Should Be Required To Abide by the General Rule and Be Compelled to Produce its Witnesses in this District.
1. Acer Has Not Challenged the General Rule that Plaintiffs Should Be Deposed in this Judicial District and Has Failed to Prove Undue Hardship that Justifies a Deviation from that Rule. As detailed in TPL’s motion, the law in this district unambiguously requires a plaintiff “to make himself or herself available for examination in the district in which suit was brought.” Lexington, 1999 WL 33292943, at *9. “To avoid the application of this rule, a plaintiff has the burden of proving that undue hardship or exceptional or compelling circumstances justify his refusal to travel to his chosen forum.” Rolex, 1999 WL 200092, at *1. Acer has not disputed the applicability of the general rule in this case and has not demonstrated any exceptional or compelling circumstances that justify a deviation from this rule.
2 Although Acer argues for case-by-case analysis for each witness, it at the same time complains about the cumulative burden of producing all of its Taiwanese witnesses in this district. Opp. at 6:11-17. Acer cannot have it both ways.
In its opposition, Acer insinuates that minimizing alleged logistical and economic inefficiencies justifies deviating from the rule that plaintiff has to make himself available for examination in its chosen venue. Opp. at 5:25-26. First, Acer suggests that costs and burdens associated with traveling to San Francisco may amount to exceptional or compelling circumstance.3 Id. at 6:8-7:12. However, the law is clear that travel costs do not constitute undue hardship. See, e.g., Newman v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority, 962 F.2d 589, 591-92 (7th Cir. 1992) (plaintiff’s claimed financial difficulties did not excuse her from her failure to appear for deposition in the district where she brought suit); Seuthe v. Renwal Prods., Inc., 38 F.R.D. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (requiring plaintiff, a resident of West Germany, to submit to deposition in New York, where he brought suit, over his objection of financial hardship). Second, Acer’s proposal to have counsel for both parties travel to Taiwan, South Dakota, and Irvine does not create greater judicial economies. Unlike the plaintiff in Archer Daniels v. Midland Co. v. Aon Risk Services, Inc., who agreed that all of its witnesses could appear in Decatur, Illinois (187 F.R.D. 578, 588 (D. Minn. 1999)), Acer’s witnesses are spread out literally around the world. It is efficient to have all of Acer’s witnesses appear in this judicial district for their deposition and trial testimony. Acer considered this fact in makings its decision to file suit in this district. Acer Inc. represented, in its Opposition to TPL’s Motion to Dismiss, and in the Alternative, to Transfer Venue, that its “witnesses and representatives are able to take a direct flight to San Francisco” and that discovery is less burdensome here. Docket No. 34 at 5:6-10; 8:15-18; 8:27-9:9 & 9, n.4. Judge Fogel also noted, in denying TPL’s Motion to Dismiss, that “this district affords direct access to witnesses and tangible evidence, and makes travel for parties and witnesses most convenient.” Docket No. 47 at 6:10-11 (emphasis added). Finally, Acer has not represented that all 17 Taiwanese witnesses identified in the parties’ respective Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosures could be deposed consecutively, and it is plausible, if not probable, that counsel for both parties would have to make multiple trips to Taiwan in addition to trips to South Dakota and Irvine to 3 Notably, Acer does not submit any declarations from any of Acer’s witnesses listed in the party’s Initial disclosures attesting to the alleged costs and burden associated with traveling to San Francisco for deposition and trial testimony. See Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 2008 WL 1766758, at *2 (N.D. Cal. April 15, 2008) (noting that plaintiff did not submit any declarations refuting allegations about his travel schedule). depose Acer’s percipient fact witnesses. Acer cannot have it both ways—plead that this district is the proper venue and most convenient for discovery and then refuse to provide discovery here by producing its percipient witnesses in this district. Acer’s complaint about travel costs and potential personnel time lost to deposition discovery, in essence, highlights the substantial but normal costs associated with discovery in patent litigation. By choosing to file this litigation in this district, Acer chose the forum for this litigation and should be required to assume the financial burden that comes with the litigation it commenced.
2. Acer’s Assertion that Depositions Should Be Taken at the Plaintiff’s Principal Place of Business or Residence is Inapplicable in this Case. Acer attempts to sidestep the general rule in this district by proposing a different blanket rule for corporate officers, arguing that “corporate officers should be deposed at the corporation’s principal office or business.” Opp. at 5:7-19. Many courts have ruled that “[c]orporate defendants are frequently deposed in places other than the location of the principal place of business, especially in the forum [where the action is pending], for the convenience of all parties and in the general interests of judicial economy.” Cadent Ltd. v. 3M Unitek Corp., 232 F.R.D. 625, 629 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (emphasis added). Indeed, Acer’s argument is belied by the cases it
cites. In Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., this Court compelled the plaintiff’s witness to appear for a deposition in California, not at the plaintiff’s principal place of business in Paris, France. 2008 WL 1766758 (N.D. Cal. April 15, 2008). This Court specifically recognized that “the bottom line is that a foreign corporation, subject to the in personam jurisdiction of this court, can be ordered under Rule 30(b)(6) to produce its officers, directors or managing agents in the United States to give deposition testimony.” Id. at *2 (quoting Custom Form Mfg. v. Omron Corp., 196 F.R.D. 333, 336 (N.D. Ind. 2000)). The Court also “generally agrees that [discovery] disputes may be handled more efficiently if the deposition proceeds in California.” Id.; see also Lexington, 1999 WL 33292943, at *9. The Court further noted that the plaintiff failed to present a declaration attesting to his travel schedule, that both counsel work and reside in California, and that it would be less disruptive and costly for the deposition to take place in California. Louis Vuitton, 2008 WL 1766758 at *2; see also Cadent, 232 F.R.D. at 629. Many of the same factors exist here. Acer, Inc. is a foreign corporation which, by its own admission, conducts “all of its US business through its subsidiary Acer America, which is located in San Jose.” Docket No. 34 at 3:9-10 & 5; see also Docket No. 36 at 4. Plaintiff Gateway “conducts business and owns property within this district.” Docket No. 34 at 8:16-17. There is no question that the Plaintiffs, who are subject to the in personam jurisdiction of this Court by virtue of filing their complaint here, conduct significant commercial activity in this district. Their corporate officers, directors, and employees can and should therefore be compelled to appear for deposition and trial in this district. In addition, if any discovery disputes arise during the course of these depositions, they would be far more easily resolved if the depositions were proceeding in this district as opposed to Taiwan or South Dakota. The Court in Louis Vuitton noted that the “location of counsel for both parties” in addition to “the likelihood of significant discovery disputes arising which would require resolution by the forum court” should be factors when determining deposition location. Louis Vuitton, 2008 WL 1766758, at *1. Taking into account the location of counsel, both Acer’s counsel (K&L Gates) and one out of two defense counsel (Farella Braun + Martel) reside and work in this judicial district. The other defense counsel (Kirby, Noonan, Lance and Hoge) resides and works in San Diego, only a short plane ride from this district. It is obviously more convenient for all counsel to have Plaintiffs’ depositions proceed here. Finally, as noted above, Acer does not support its allegations by submitting declarations from any of its percipient witnesses attesting to the alleged costs and burden of traveling to San Francisco for their depositions and trial testimony. Acer’s citation to James Brooks Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London is also misplaced. James Brooks states only the presumption that defendant’s deposition will proceed at his place of residence, business or employment. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57183 at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 31, 2006). As the court in Lexington clearly stated, a plaintiff is differently situated than a defendant regarding location of deposition because the plaintiff chooses to avail themselves of the forum it which it litigates. Lexington, 1999 WL 33292943, at *9. Thus, James Brooks’ presumption regarding defendants is irrelevant here. C. Acer Should Bear its Own Costs in Producing Its Witnesses in this District. Recognizing that the law of this district requires plaintiffs to make himself or herself available for examination in the district where suit is filed, Acer requests that the parties split the costs associated with the production of its own witnesses in this district. Opp. at 9:1-14. The facts of this case do not warrant cost splitting. Acer abruptly ended licensing negotiations between the parties and unilaterally chose to file this declaratory judgment action in February of this year in this district. By instigating this litigation, Acer voluntarily chose to pursue litigation and incur the resulting costs. TPL should not be required to share in Acer’s costs when Acer was the one who initiated this lawsuit. For these reasons, Acer should bear its own costs in producing its witnesses here for deposition and trial testimony.

II. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above and in TPL’s Motion to Compel the Depositions and Trial Testimony of Plaintiffs’ Witnesses in This District, TPL respectfully requests that this Court order Acer, Inc., Acer America Corp., and Gateway Inc. to produce all of their witnesses, at their own costs, for depositions and trial testimony here in this judicial district.
Dated: December 5, 2008
FARELLA BRAUN & MARTEL LLP
By: /s/ Jeffrey M. Fisher
Jeffrey M. Fisher
Attorneys for Defendants
TECHNOLOGY PROPERTIES LIMITED
and ALLIACENSE LIMITED
Dated: December 5, 2008
KIRBY NOONAN LANCE & HOGE
BY: /s/ Charles T. Hoge
Charles T. Hoge
Attorneys for Defendants
PATRIOT SCIENTIFIC CORPORATION

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2nd Pacer--REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN JOSE DIVISION
ACER, INC., ACER AMERICA
CORPORATION and GATEWAY, INC.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
TECHNOLOGY PROPERTIES LIMITED, PATRIOT SCIENTIFIC CORPORATION, and ALLIACENSE LIMITED,
Defendants.
Case No. 5:08-cv-00877 JF
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
Date: December 19, 2008
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Dept: Courtroom 3, 5th Floor
Before: Honorable Jeremy Fogel

I. INTRODUCTION

Regardless of whether Plaintiffs’ motion to amend is granted, this Court will be presented with, and Defendants will have to address, issues related to two patents 6,598,148 (“‘148 patent”) and 5,530,890 (“‘890 patent”) that Plaintiffs seek to add to this case. In the two cases related to this matter, Plaintiffs HTC and Asustek have already asserted these patents. See Case No. 08-882 [Dkt. No. 34] and Case No. 08-884 [Dkt. Nos. 56, 58, 60]. Permitting Plaintiffs’ amendment would therefore not burden this Court, would not prejudice Defendants and would be in the interest of justice in preserving Plaintiffs’ rights to have a declaration on patents from the same patent portfolio—based on a single specification—that it is already pending before this Court. Defendants Technology Properties Limited, Patriot Scientific Corporation and Alliacense Limited (“Defendants”) argue, however, that this Court should deny Plaintiffs’ motion to add the two additional patents because Plaintiffs’ motion is both premature and tardy. Putting aside the logical inconsistency of their positions for the moment, Defendants’ opposition is incorrect on both points. Plaintiffs’ motion is not tardy because: (1) it was timely filed after the Court denied Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Transfer (“motion to dismiss”), keeping the matter in this jurisdiction; (2) it was brought after weeks of attempted meet-and-confer with Defendants who were evidently putting Plaintiffs’ off in hopes that they could argue “delay” in opposition to the motion; and (3) it was filed within a reasonable time after Plaintiffs were notified of the two additional patents. Plaintiffs’ motion is not premature as this Court has now decided to keep the action, the Texas court is likely to dismiss the actions in Texas, and Defendants have now asserted with particularity the two additional patents against Acer, Acer America and Gateway.

II. FACTS

Plaintiffs initially filed a declaratory judgment action United States Patent 5,809,336, 5,784,584, and 5,440,749 because those patents were the only ones in which Acer Inc., Acer America Corp., and Gateway Inc. (“Plaintiffs”) received claim charts. See Barry Decl.4-7; Ares Decl. 4-6, 8. Declaratory judgment plaintiffs may not ask for declaratory relief on patents with which they have not been specifically threatened. Cat Tech LLC v. Tubemaster, Inc., 528 On April 25, 2008, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint or transfer this action and filed two separate suits in the Eastern District of Texas, for the first time asserting infringement of the ‘148 patent. Less than two months later, Defendants filed a third lawsuit in the Eastern District of Texas asserting the ‘890 patent. Both the ‘148 and ‘890 patents are subject to this motion. Defendants’ Opposition [Dkt. No. 61] at 2:23-27. Plaintiffs timely met and conferred with Defendants on multiple occasions to seek a stipulation to file an amended complaint in the event the Court decided to keep the case. See Declaration of Harold H. Davis in Support of Motion for Leave to Amend, 2 (“Davis Decl.”)[Dkt. No. 53]; July 18, 2008 Joint Case Management Statement at pp. 2-3 [Dkt. No. 42]; November 5, 2008 Joint Case Management Statement, p. 3:15-21 and Section 5 [Dkt. No. 48]. Defendants informed Plaintiffs they were still considering Plaintiffs’ request and had not decided yet. Id. On October 21, 2008, this Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 47. Plaintiffs again requested a stipulation from Defendants that the ‘148 and ‘890 patents be added to this action, even raising the issue at the November 7 Case Management Conference (“CMC”). November 7, 2008 Transcript of Hearing [Dkt. No. 51] at 6:14-18. In open court, Defendants’ counsel again said that no decision had been reached about the stipulation and represented that there was no urgency to resolve the issue. Id. at 6:20-25. However, the Court introduced some urgency by entering a claim construction schedule at the November 7 CMC. Id. at 5:18-22. Not wanting the claim construction of the three named patents to get far ahead of the ‘148 and ‘890 patents, Plaintiffs asked one last time for an answer on the request for stipulation, then filed this motion one week after the November 7 CMC when Defendants failed to timely respond. See Davis Decl.

III. ARGUMENT

As an initial matter, Defendants’ opposition fails to raise any arguments regarding bad faith, futility, or prejudice, and thus Plaintiffs’ motion to amend can be granted on that basis alone. DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1987) (reversing district court’s denial of motion to amend complaint to add defendants because “The party opposing amendment bears the burden of showing prejudice.”); Bowles v. Reade, 198 F.3d 752, 757-58 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that the Ninth Circuit has reversed denials of motions to amend where no
specific findings of prejudice, bad faith or futility were made). Instead, efendants’ only arguments against the motion are that it is “seven months” late, and that it is “premature.” Even if these arguments justified denial of the motion (which they do not), both arguments are erroneous. A. Plaintiffs Motion to Amend is Not Tardy Plaintiffs have not unreasonably delayed filing this motion. Once Defendants filed their Complaints asserting infringement of the ‘148 and ‘890 patents in Texas, Plaintiffs seasonably requested a stipulation to amend their Complaint to add these additional patents. Plaintiffs have diligently raised the issue in both joint CMC statements, indicating that this motion would be needed if Defendants did not stipulate. While Defendants’ motion to dismiss was pending, and in the absence of a definitive “No” from Defendants on the request for a stipulation to amend, Plaintiffs saw no need to burden this Court with a motion to amend that might be rendered moot (if the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss) or be unnecessary (if Defendants stipulated after the Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss). At the November 7 CMC, Plaintiffs raised the issue of amending the complaint to add the two patents, explaining that Defendants had not responded to requests for a stipulation. Counsel for Defendants indicated that the amendment was not pressing: November 7, 2008 Transcript of Hearing [Dkt. No. 51] at p. 6:20-25. Because Defendants refused to reply to Plaintiffs even after that representation, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion one week later. Defendants have either been leading Plaintiffs on in refusing to respond to multiple requests for a stipulation to amend in hopes they could assert some sort of “lateness” argument, or they were disingenuous with the Court that this matter was not “pressing.” As a matter of fairness and equity, Defendants cannot complain about delay in filing the request for the amended complaint when Defendants were responsible for the delay in (a) refusing to respond to Plaintiffs’ request for a stipulation and telling the court at the hearing there was no urgency in the matter, and (b) bringing a motion to dismiss which had the potential of making any earlier motion moot. In any event, it was reasonable for Plaintiffs to await this Court’s ruling on Defendants’ motion to dismiss before burdening the court with the amendment motion, especially when Defendants had not declined to stipulate to the amendment, and had in fact, agreed to a similar stipulation in a related case. Defendants could not and did not argue in their opposition how the alleged delay could possibly have prejudiced them in this matter. Defendants suggest that Plaintiffs should have included the ‘148 and ‘890 patents in their original complaint. Without citation to any evidence, Defendants baldly assert that they raised all five patents with Plaintiffs during licensing discussions before Plaintiffs filed suit. Defendants’ Opposition at 2:20-22 [Dkt. No. 61]. The ‘148 and ‘890 patents were not included in the original complaint because Defendants did not make specific infringement allegations concerning them. Without a specific allegation of infringement, declaratory relief was not appropriate as the ‘148 and ‘890 patents. Cat Tech LLC v. Tubemaster, Inc., 528 F.3d 871, 881-82 (Fed. Cir. 2008). While Plaintiffs admit that the parties generally discussed the Moore Microprocessor Patent (“MMP”) portfolio, Defendants did not provide details of alleged infringement of the ‘148 and ‘890 patents against Plaintiffs Acer, Acer America, and Gateway. Instead, Plaintiffs only received claim charts regarding the three patents that are the subject of Plaintiffs’ original complaint. See Barry Decl. 4-7, Ares Decl. 4-6, 8. Finally, even at this stage, Defendants have undercut their own tardiness claims by asserting that Plaintiffs’ motion is “premature” due to the uncertainty as to whether the Eastern District of Texas will keep Defendants later filed cases.
B. Plaintiffs Motion to Amend is Not Premature Defendants also inconsistently assert that Plaintiffs motion to amend is premature because of the pending Texas actions. This is a red herring that does not justify denial of Plaintiffs’ motion. This Court has already decided to retain jurisdiction over all five patents, so even if the court in the Eastern District of Texas decided to retain jurisdiction over some or all of the cases (which appears unlikely in light of recent 5th Circuit law on transfers), this Court will expend judicial resources resolving patents that could be subject to a concurrent pending Texas action. Now that this Court has decided to retain jurisdiction, it should no longer put this case on hold depending on the outcome of events in Texas. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the Texas cases is likely to be granted. Now that this Court has agreed that the California actions were “first filed” and has retained jurisdiction over the cases, there is ample reason for the Texas court to find that transfer of its pending ‘148 and ‘890 patent cases to this district is warranted. The principle reasons to transfer are that the ‘148 and ‘890 patents are based on the same specification as the patents in suit before this Court, five of the six parties are California-based entities, and the subsequent Texas actions appear to be the sort of “manipulative” add-on cases discussed with disapproval by the Federal Circuit in the recent Micron decision. Micron Tech., Inc. v. Mosaid Techs., Inc., 518 F.3d 897, 903-04 (Fed. Cir. 2008)(Court “gives little weight to the . . . reason . . . that the second-filed infringement
action is broader than the first filed declaratory judgment action. This reason carries little weight because a patent holder may often easily file an artificially broader infringement suit to avoid declaratory judgment jurisdiction. If, as in this case, a patent holder could simply name another defendant or add a few additional claims to the later filed infringement, then the Supreme Court’s more lenient standard for the declaratory judgment plaintiff would lose its primary intended effect.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs’ motion cannot be both tardy and premature. Once this Court decided to retain jurisdiction over all five patents and entered the case management schedule on November 7, 2008, it was reasonable for Plaintiffs to seek a stipulation to amend the additional patents, and then file the instant motion a week later to avoid being accused of waiting too long. Because the
amendment will not prejudice Defendants, is not futile, and is not made in bad faith, Plaintiffs respectfully request their Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint be granted.
Dated: December 5, 2008 K&L GATES LLP
By: /s/ Harold H. Davis
Michael J. Bettinger (SBN 122196)
Timothy P. Walker (SBN 105001)
Harold H. Davis, Jr. (SBN 235552)
Holly Hogan (SBN 238714)
Jas Dhillon (SBN 252842)
Attorneys for Plaintiffs ACER, INC., ACER
AMERICA CORPORATION and
GATEWAY, INC.

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Ein schönes Wochenende und Grüsse in die Runde
CJ

dachte es hätte sich mittlerweile mehr getan, habe jetzt ca. 3 Monate nicht mehr geschaut.  Danke an die unermüdlichen Informanten hier im Forum, da kann man sich kurz und bündig updaten, im Gegensatz zu dem WO-Thread gibt es hier nicht so viel Blablabla.

Jetzt wünsche ich allen Investierten, dass unsere Geduld im nächsten Jahr endlich belohnt wird.

Frohe Weihnachten und ein erfreuliches 2009 !

schön Dich auch wieder einmal zu lesen. Auf eine schöne Belohnung von PTSC in 2009 hoffe ich auch.

wenn ich könnte......
euch allen ein vorzeitiges schönes weihnachtsgeschenk machen .....
leider bin ich nicht der weihnachtsmann ....
aber ich wünsche euch und allen investierten ....
gesundheit, ein frohes fest und spätestens nächstes jahr ... die dicke kohle !

www.pinksheetstocksblog.com/2008/12/07/...er-for-december-8th/

Gestern abend eine Mail von Ron (Ronran) auf PTSC-yahoo-Group gelesen: Der J3 Fall ist "dismissed" in Tx.
Also nicht "pending". Das heißt, man kann jederzeit erneut klagen.
Der Fall wurde an den Richter Ward übertragen, nicht ans Gericht nach Tx. Das sind die juristischen Feinheiten.
Man muß jetzt die Entscheidungen von Judge Ward über die laufenden Anträge der T3 und von TPL abwarten.

New Pacer--(ORDER) Signed By Judge Ward--Came on consideration the Motion for Extension of Time.  IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS MARSHALL DIVISION (1) TECHNOLOGY PROPERTIES LIMITED, INC. and (2) PATRIOT SCIENTIFIC CORPORATION, Plaintiffs, vs. (1) ACER, INC. (2) ACER AMERICA CORPORATION (3) GATEWAY, INC. Defendants. ORDER Came on consideration the Motion for Extension of Time for Defendants Acer Inc., Acer America Corporation, and Gateway Inc. to Answer, Move or Otherwise Respond to Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint and the Court is of the opinion that the Motion should be GRANTED. IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Motion for Extension of Time for Defendants Acer Inc., Acer America Corporation, and Gateway Inc. to Answer, Move or Otherwise Respond is GRANTED and the deadline for Defendants Acer Inc., Acer America Corporation, and Gateway Inc. to file their Answers or Otherwise Respond to Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint is extended up to and including January 16, 2009.  Signed By Judge Ward 12/08/2008

Recently The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) announced that for the first time the evidenced quality of care delivery will begin impacting the amounts healthcare providers are reimbursed for services provided to Medicare patients. “American healthcare will be transformed from a price-based to a value-based healthcare delivery system when purchasers and patients have access to reliable health information and can knowledgeably select and reward providers who demonstrate superior medical and service performance,” predicted William Mohlenbrock, M.D., Iameter’s former chairman and chief executive officer.

Dr. Mohlenbrock is a nationally recognized expert on measuring and improving medical quality and cost efficiencies. In 1983, he co-founded Iameter and developed the Acuity Index Method, a Severity Risk-Adjustment Tool used in assessing inpatient data as the basis for physician-directed, clinical quality improvements. He was also a co-founder of Crossflo to address the growing movement to share medical data as well as solve law enforcement and public safety and security data sharing challenges. Dr. Mohlenbrock remains a subject matter expert for Crossflo in the growing healthcare data sharing field.

About Crossflo Systems, Inc.

Crossflo Systems, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Patriot Scientific Corporation, provides data sharing solutions to the public sector. Crossflo’s flagship software product, the Crossflo DataExchange® (CDX) solution, is commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) middleware specifically designed for interagency and cross-domain data sharing. Standards-based architecture and intuitive interface design enable end users to strengthen control, selectively share information and rapidly connect disparate data sources across multiple platforms. Crossflo solutions are backed by operationally oriented professional services and expertise in HL7, NIEM, GJXDM, and IEPD deployments. With Crossflo, agencies involved with Justice and Public Safety, Public and Private Healthcare, National Defense, and Domestic Security are able to securely and rapidly access unlimited data sources to provide an accurate picture of people, assets, situations, and events. For more information on Crossflo Systems, Inc., visit: www.crossflo.com.

About Patriot Scientific Corporation

Headquartered in Carlsbad, California, Patriot Scientific Corporation provides data sharing and secure data solutions for a connected world. Patriot Scientific has recently embarked on an aggressive business expansion initiative complementing its recent acquisition of data sharing software provider, Crossflo Systems Inc. Patriot is evaluating full M&A and minority investments in early-stage technology companies in the data sharing software and secure networking technology sectors. These investments are funded with revenues generated, in a large part, from the continuing successful Moore Microprocessor Patent™ Portfolio licensing partnership with The TPL Group. Patriot Scientific’s integrated core intelligence solution addresses the critical data/information sharing needs of the healthcare industry, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and federal, state, and local public safety and law enforcement agencies. For more information on Patriot Scientific Corporation, visit: www.ptsc.com.

Safe Harbor Statement under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Statements in this news release looking forward in time involve risks and uncertainties, including the risks associated with the effect of changing economic conditions, trends in the products markets, variations in the company's cash flow, market acceptance risks, patent litigation, technical development risks, seasonality and other risk factors detailed in the company's Securities and Exchange Commission filings.




Contact:
Patriot Scientific Corporation

www.duttonassociates.com/research/ptsc/...ptsc_note_121008.pdf

(4) Barco N.V. v. Technology Properties Ltd., Patriot Scientific Corp. and Alliacense Ltd., Case No. 08-05398 HRL (N.D. Cal., filed on December 1, 2008). On February 8, 2008, Acer, Inc., Acer America Corp. and Gateway, Inc. filed the first action identified above against Technology Properties Limited (“TPL”), Patriot Scientific Corporation (“Patriot”), and Alliacense Limited (“Alliacense”) (the “Acer/Gateway Action”) seeking declaratory judgment of noninfringement and invalidity of United States Patent Nos. 5,809,336 (“’336 patent”), 5,784,584 (“’584 patent”), and 5,440,749 (“’749 patent”). The second and third actions identified above were filed on the same date. HTC and ASUSTeK have amended their complaints to add patents to the case, as reflected in the table below. In the first case, ACER, ACER filed a motion to Case 5:08-cv-00877-JF have its case considered to be related to the HTC and ASUSTeK cases. That motion was granted, and the first three cases are now considered related and they are assigned to Judge Fogel. Or. Granting Pl.’s Mot. To Consider Whether Cases Should be Related (April 29, 2008). The fourth action, in which moving party herein, Barco, N.V., is the plaintiff, was filed on December 1, 2008. As explained below, all four actions are “related” within the meaning of Civil Local Rule 3-12 and should be assigned to the same judge. Local Rule 3-12 provides that an action is related to another action pending in this district when “(1) [t]he actions concern substantially the same parties, property, transaction or event; and (2) [i]t appears likely that there will be an unduly burdensome duplication of labor and expense or conflicting results if the cases are conducted before different Judges.” As shown in the chart below, the Actions at issue here satisfy both prongs of this test:
No.
Plaintiffs
Defendants
Relief sought
Patents
08-877
Acer, Inc. Acer America Corp. Gateway, Inc. Technology Properties, Ltd. Patriot Scientific Corp. Alliacense Ltd. Declaratory judgment of noninfringement and invalidity 5,440,749 5,784,584 5,530,8901 5,809,336 6,598,148 08-882 HTC Corporation HTC America, Inc. Technology Properties, Ltd. Patriot Scientific Corp. Alliacense Ltd. Declaratory judgment of noninfringement and invalidity 5,440,749 5,784,584 5,530,890 5,809,336 6,598,148 08-884 ASUSTeK Computer ASUS Computer Int’l Technology Properties, Ltd. Patriot Scientific Corp. Alliacense Ltd. MCM Portfolio, LLC Declaratory judgment of noninfringement and invalidity 5,440,749 5,784,584 5,530,890 5,809,336 6,438,638 6,976,623 7,295,443 08-05398 Barco N.V. Technology Properties, Ltd. Patriot Scientific Corp. Alliacense Ltd. Declaratory judgment of noninfringement and invalidity ,440,749 5,784,584 5,530,890 1 As described below, Acer has filed a motion to add the ‘890 and the ‘148 patent to its case. If that motion is granted, the ‘890 patent will be common to all cases, although it is not currently in the Acer case. As shown above, each of the cases concerns substantially the same parties, property, transaction or event. All four cases currently involve at least two common patents-in-suit (the’548 and ’749 patents), which are also all allegedly owned or controlled by TPL, Patriot and/or Alliacense. In addition, Acer has filed a motion to add the ‘148 and ‘890 patents to its case, and if that motion is granted, the three patents for which Barco seeks relief will be common to all the cases (the three common patents are shown in bold in the table). All four actions seek essentially the same relief, and the defendants are substantially identical.2 The second prong of Local Rule 3-12(a) is also satisfied: Because the actions involve common patents and identical defendants, they will require adjudication of many common legal and factual issues relating to claim construction, invalidity, ownership, standing and other affirmative defenses. Having the Actions conducted before more than one judge would create an unduly burdensome duplication of labor and expense and would present a substantial possibility of conflicting results on common legal and factual issues. Because the Actions satisfy both prongs of Local Rule 3-12(a), Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Actions be deemed “related” to each other and assigned to Judge Jeremy Fogel pursuant to Local Rule 3-12(f).
Dated: December 10, 2008
BAKER & McKENZIE LLP
By: s/ Edward K. Runyan
Daniel J. O’Connor
Edward K. Runyan
Tod L. Gamlen
Attorneys for Plaintiff Barco N.V. (in Case No. 08-05398 HRL)
2 The ASUSTeK action has one additional defendant, MCM Portfolio LLC. Plaintiffs believe that MCM is merely a patent holding company that is owned or controlled by the other defendants, thus presenting no material difference in the identity of the defendants.

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Edward K. Runyan, declare I reside in the State of Illinois, over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to the within action; my business address is Baker & McKenzie LLP, 130 East Randolph Drive, Chicago, IL 60601. On December 10, 2008, the following documents were served:
1. CIVIL L.R. 3-12 ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO CONSIDER WHETHER CASES SHOULD BE RELATED.
2. DECLARATION OF EDWARD K. RUNYAN RE CIVIL L.R. 3-12 MOTION TO CONSIDER WHETHER CASES SHOULD BE RELATED.
3. PROPOSED ORDER RE CIVIL L.R. 3-12 ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO CONSIDER WHETHER CASES SHOULD BE RELATED.

8. ASUSTeK denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 8.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
9. ASUSTeK admits that United States Patent No. 5, 809,336 is entitled “High Performance Microprocessor Having Variable Speed System Clock.” ASUSTeK denies that United States Patent No. 5, 809,336 was duly and legally issued. Except as expressly admitted or denied herein, ASUSTeK lacks sufficient information to admit or deny the remaining allegations of Paragraph 9 of the Counterclaims and therefore denies them.
10. ASUSTeK admits that United States Patent No. 5,440,749 is entitled “High Performance, Low Cost Microprocessor Architecture.” ASUSTeK denies that United States Patent No. 5,440,749 was duly and legally issued. Except as expressly admitted or denied herein, ASUSTeK lacks sufficient information to admit or deny the remaining allegations of Paragraph 10 of the Counterclaims and therefore denies them.
11. ASUSTeK admits that United States Patent No. 5,530,890 is entitled “High Performance, Low Cost Microprocessor.” ASUSTeK denies that United States Patent No. 5,530,890 was duly and legally issued. Except as expressly admitted or denied herein, ASUSTeK lacks sufficient information to admit or deny the remaining allegations of Paragraph 11 of the Counterclaims and therefore denies them.
12. ASUSTeK admits that United States Patent No. 6.438,638 is entitled “Flashtoaster For Reading Several Types of Flash-Memory Cards With or Without a PC.” ASUSTeK denies that United States Patent No. 6.438,638 was duly and legally issued. Except as expressly admitted or denied herein, ASUSTeK lacks sufficient information to admit or deny the remaining allegations of Paragraph 12 of the Counterclaims and therefore denies them.
13. ASUSTeK admits that United States Patent No. 6,976,623 is entitled “Flash Juke Box.” ASUSTeK denies that United States Patent No. 6,976,623 was duly and legally issued. Except as expressly admitted or denied herein, ASUSTeK lacks sufficient information to admit or deny the remaining allegations of Paragraph 13 of the Counterclaims and therefore denies them.
14. ASUSTeK admits that United States Patent No. 7,295,443 is entitled “Smartconnect Universal Flash Media Card Adapters.” ASUSTeK denies that United States Patent No. 7,295,443 was duly and legally issued. Except as expressly admitted or denied herein, ASUSTeK lacks sufficient information to admit or deny the remaining allegations of Paragraph
14 of the Counterclaims and therefore denies them.
15. ASUSTeK admits that United States Patent No. 7,162,549 is entitled “Multimode Controller For Intelligent and ‘Dumb’ Flash Cards.” ASUSTeK denies that United States Patent No. 7,162,549 was duly and legally issued. Except as expressly admitted or denied herein, ASUSTeK lacks sufficient information to admit or deny the remaining allegations of Paragraph 15 of the Counterclaims and therefore denies them.

COUNT I

16. ASUSTeK realleges and incorporates by reference the entirety of its responses set forth in paragraphs 1 through 15 above as if fully set forth herein.
17. ASUSTeK denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 17.
18. ASUSTeK denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 18.
19. ASUSTeK denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 19.

COUNT II

20. ASUSTeK realleges and incorporates by reference the entirety of its responses set forth in paragraphs 1 through 15 above as if fully set forth herein.
21. ASUSTeK denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 21.
22. ASUSTeK denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 22.
23. ASUSTeK denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 23.

COUNT III

24. ASUSTeK realleges and incorporates by reference the entirety of its responses set forth in paragraphs 1 through 15 above as if fully set forth herein.
25. ASUSTeK denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 25.
26. ASUSTeK denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 26.
27. ASUSTeK denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 27.

COUNT IV

28. ASUSTeK realleges and incorporates by reference the entirety of its responses set forth in paragraphs 1 through 15 above as if fully set forth herein.
29. ASUSTeK denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 29.
30. ASUSTeK denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 30.
31. ASUSTeK denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 31.

COUNT V

32. ASUSTeK realleges and incorporates by reference the entirety of its responses set forth in paragraphs 1 through 15 above as if fully set forth herein.
33. ASUSTeK denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 33.
34. ASUSTeK denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 34.
35. ASUSTeK denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 35.

COUNT VI

36. ASUSTeK realleges and incorporates by reference the entirety of its responses set forth in paragraphs 1 through 15 above as if fully set forth herein.
37. ASUSTeK denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 37.
38. ASUSTeK denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 38.
39. ASUSTeK denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 39.

COUNT VII

40. ASUSTeK realleges and incorporates by reference the entirety of its responses set forth in paragraphs 1 through 15 above as if fully set forth herein.
41. ASUSTeK denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 41.
42. ASUSTeK denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 42.
43. ASUSTeK denies the allegations set forth in Paragraph 43.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

44. ASUSTeK hereby incorporates by reference its answers to all paragraphs in the Counterclaims as though fully set forth herein. ASUSTeK denies that the TPL Entities are entitled to the relief sought in the TPL Entities’ prayer for relief against ASUSTeK, or otherwise.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

In addition to the defenses described below, ASUSTeK reserves all affirmative defenses under Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the patent laws of the United States and any other defenses, at law or in equity, which may now exist or in the future may be available based on discovery and further factual investigation in this case:
1. The Counterclaims and each of the allegations therein do not entitle the TPL Entities to relief because ASUSTeK does not and has not infringed, directly or indirectly, any valid claim of the patents-in-suit.
2. Each claim of the patents-in-suit is invalid and/or unenforceable for failure to meet one or more of the requirements for patentability set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., including but not limited to 35 U.S.C. 101, 102, 103 and/or 112.
3. The Counterclaims and each of the allegations therein do not entitle the TPL Entities to relief because the TPL Entities’ claims are barred by laches, waiver and/or estoppel.
4. The TPL Entities’ recovery for alleged infringement, if any, is limited to any alleged infringement committed no more than six years prior to the filing of the Counterclaims,
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 286.
5. The TPL Entities’ Counterclaims are limited by failure to comply with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 287.
6. The TPL Entities are barred by 35 U.S.C. 288 from recovering any costs associated with this suit.
7. The Counterclaims and each of the allegations therein fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
8. On information and belief, the TPL Entities’ claims are barred to the extent that some or all of the accused activities are licensed under the patents-in-suit.
9. On information and belief, the TPL Entities have exhausted any patent rights against ASUSTeK concerning the patents-in-suit.
10. On information and belief, the TPL Entities lack sufficient right, title, or interest in the patents-in-suit to maintain their Counterclaims.
11. On information and belief, the TPL Entities’ claims for infringement of U.S. Pat. No. 5,809,336 are barred because that patent is unenforceable as a result of inequitable conduct.
a. At least Mr. George Shaw, an employee of Patriot Scientific Corporation, engaged in inequitable conduct during the prosecution of patent application ser. no. 08/484,918, which became U.S. Pat. No. 5,809,336. Mr. Shaw was the principal liaison of Patriot Scientific Corporation to its patent attorneys and was therefore substantively involved in the prosecution of application ser. no. 08/484,918.
b. During 1992, Mr. Shaw was a contractor to Nanotronics Corporation (“Nanotronics”) involved in design work concerning a microprocessor related to the ShBoom microprocessor (“Nanotronics Microprocessor”).
c. Engineers working for Nanotronics, including Mr. Shaw, intended to implement in the Nanotronics Microprocessor a critical component of the claimed subject matter of U.S. Pat. No. 5,809,336: a ring oscillator system clock.
d. At some point in early 1992, engineers working for Nanotronics decided to forego the use of a ring oscillator system clock in the Nanotronics Microprocessor because of the risk that a microprocessor using such a clock would not work.
e. Mr. Shaw was aware of this decision by Nanotronics engineers and was aware of the deficiencies in a ring oscillator system clock in the 1995-2000 time frame. Mr. Shaw further worked with one or more engineers at Patriot Scientific Corporation, the successor to Nanotronics, to correct flaws in the design of the ring oscillator system clock disclosed in U.S. Pat. No. 5,809,336.
f. Mr. Shaw was the principal liaison and technical contact of Patriot Scientific Corporation for its then patent attorney, Willis Higgins. In that capacity, Mr. Shaw attended several interviews during 1997 and 1998 with the Examiner assigned by the United States Patent and Trademark Office to patent application ser. no. 08/484,918.
g. Despite believing that a ring oscillator system clock would not work as described in patent application ser. no. 08/484,918 or that undue experimentation would be required to achieve a microprocessor with a functioning ring oscillator system clock, Mr. Shaw told the Examiner that a ring oscillator system clock would work to drive a microprocessor at its fastest safe operating speed, thus conveying the impression that a ring oscillator system clock was an improvement over other clocking systems. In particular, Mr. Shaw failed to tell the Examiner that Nanotronics had abandoned the design because it likely would not work. h. Mr. Shaw intentionally deceived the United States Patent and Trademark Office in order to expedite the allowance of patent application ser. no. 08/484,918. i. The deception related to material facts which, if they had been fully disclosed to the Examiner, would have allowed the Examiner to make a prima facie rejection under 35 U.S.C. 112. j. At least Mr. Higgins engaged in inequitable conduct during the prosecution of patent application ser. no. 08/484,918, which became U.S. Pat. No. 5,809,336. Mr. Higgins was the prosecuting attorney responsible for the prosecution of application ser. no. 08/484,918.
k. Mr. Higgins intentionally deceived the United States Patent and Trademark Office by affirmatively stating that Mr. Moore and Mr. Fish were co-inventors of application ser. no. 08/484,918 and never correcting this statement of inventorship.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, ASUSTeK pray for judgment as follows:
1. Judgment ordering that the TPL Entities be denied all relief requested in their Counterclaims and take nothing;
2. Judgment declaring and adjudging that ASUSTeK has not infringed, directly or indirectly, any valid claim of the patents-in-suit as properly construed, literally or
under the doctrine of equivalents;
3. Judgment declaring and adjudging that the patents-in-suit are invalid;
4. Judgment declaring and adjudging that the patents-in-suit are
unenforceable;
5. Judgment awarding ASUSTeK all its costs incurred in responding to the Counterclaims, including but not limited to ASUSTeK’s attorneys’ fees pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 285;
6. Judgment awarding ASUSTeK such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Dated: December 11, 2008
WHITE & CASE LLP
By: /s/ Kyle D. Chen
Kyle D. Chen
Taryn Lam
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
ASUSTEK COMPUTER, INC. and
ASUS COMPUTER INTERNATIONAL

4. ASUSTeK fehlt hinreichende Information, um zuzugeben, dass die Behauptungen in Paragraphen 4 der Gegenforderungen ausziehen, oder zu bestreiten, und bestreitet sie deswegen.
5. ASUSTeK gibt zu, dass die Behauptungen in Paragraphen 5 ausziehen.
6. ASUSTeK gibt zu, dass die Behauptungen in Paragraphen 6 ausziehen.
RECHTSPRECHUNG

7. ASUSTeK gibt zu, dass die Behauptungen in Paragraphen 7 ausziehen.
8. ASUSTeK bestreitet, dass die Behauptungen in Paragraphen 8 ausziehen.
ALLGEMEINE BEHAUPTUNGEN
9. ASUSTeK gibt zu dass Vereinigte Staaten Nr. Patentieren 5, wird 809,336 â€oeHigh-Leistungs-Mikroprozessor betitelt, Der Veränderliche Geschwindigkeit System Clock.†ASUSTeK Hat, bestreitet dass Vereinigte Staaten Nr. Patentieren 5, 809,336 wurde ordnungsmäßig und gesetzlich herausgegeben. Außer, als ausdrücklich zugegeben oder hierin bestritten, fehlt ASUSTeK hinreichende Information, um die übrigen Behauptungen von Paragraphen 9 der Gegenforderungen zuzugeben oder zu bestreiten, und bestreitet sie deswegen.
10. ASUSTeK gibt zu dass Vereinigte Staaten Nr. 5,440,749 Patentieren wird â€oeHigh-Leistung betitelt, bestreitet Tief Kosten-Mikroprozessor Architecture.†ASUSTeK dass Vereinigte Staaten Nr. 5,440,749 Patentieren ordnungsmäßig und gesetzlich wurde ausgegeben. Außer, als ausdrücklich zugegeben oder hierin bestritten, fehlt ASUSTeK hinreichende Information, um die übrigen Behauptungen von Paragraphen 10 der Gegenforderungen zuzugeben oder zu bestreiten, und bestreitet sie deswegen.
11. ASUSTeK gibt zu dass Vereinigte Staaten Nr. 5,530,890 Patentieren wird â€oeHigh-Leistung betitelt, bestreitet Niedriges Gekostetes Microprocessor.†ASUSTeK dass Vereinigte Staaten Nr. 5,530,890 Patentieren ordnungsmäßig und gesetzlich wurde ausgegeben. Außer, als ausdrücklich zugegeben oder hierin bestritten, fehlt ASUSTeK hinreichende Information, um die übrigen Behauptungen von Paragraphen 11 der Gegenforderungen zuzugeben oder zu bestreiten, und bestreitet sie deswegen.
12. ASUSTeK gibt zu dass Vereinigte Staaten Nr. 6.438,638 Patentieren wird â€oeFlashtoaster Für das Lesen Einiger Arten von Blitz-Gedächtnis-Karten betitelt Mit oder Ohne ein PC.†ASUSTeK bestreitet dass Vereinigte Staaten Nr. 6.438,638 Patentieren ordnungsmäßig und gesetzlich wurde ausgegeben. Außer, als ausdrücklich zugegeben oder hierin bestritten, fehlt ASUSTeK hinreichende Information, um die übrigen Behauptungen von Paragraphen 12 der Gegenforderungen zuzugeben oder zu bestreiten, und bestreitet sie deswegen.
13. ASUSTeK gibt zu dass Vereinigte Staaten Nr. 6,976,623 Patentieren wird betitelt â€oeFlash Juke Box.†ASUSTeK bestreitet dass Vereinigte Staaten Nr. 6,976,623 Patentieren war ordnungsmäßig und gesetzlich herausgegeben. Außer, als ausdrücklich zugegeben oder hierin bestritten, fehlt ASUSTeK hinreichende Information, um die übrigen Behauptungen von Paragraphen 13 der Gegenforderungen zuzugeben oder zu bestreiten, und bestreitet sie deswegen.
14. ASUSTeK gibt zu dass Vereinigte Staaten Nr. 7,295,443 Patentieren wird betitelt â€oeSmartconnect-Universell-Blitz-Medien-Karte Adapters.†ASUSTeK bestreitet dass Vereinigte Staaten Nr. 7,295,443 Patentieren war ordnungsmäßig und gesetzlich herausgegeben. Außer, als ausdrücklich zugegeben oder hierin bestritten, fehlt ASUSTeK hinreichende Information, um die übrigen Behauptungen von Paragraphen zuzugeben oder zu bestreiten
14 der Gegenforderungen und deswegen bestreitet sie.
15. ASUSTeK gibt zu dass Vereinigte Staaten Nr. 7,162,549 Patentieren wird betitelt â€oeMultimode-Controller Für Intelligent und â€~Dumbâ€TM Blitz Cards.†ASUSTeK bestreitet dass Vereinigte Staaten Nr. 7,162,549 Patentieren ordnungsmäßig und gesetzlich wurde ausgegeben. Außer, als ausdrücklich zugegeben oder hierin bestritten, fehlt ASUSTeK hinreichende Information, um die übrigen Behauptungen von Paragraphen 15 der Gegenforderungen zuzugeben oder zu bestreiten, und bestreitet sie deswegen.

GRAF ICH

16. ASUSTeK wiederbehauptet und integriert von Verweis die Gesamtheit seiner Antwortengruppe an in Paragraphen 1 durch 15 oben, als ob völlig hierin dargestellt.
17. ASUSTeK bestreitet, dass die Behauptungen in Paragraphen 17 ausziehen.
18. ASUSTeK bestreitet, dass die Behauptungen in Paragraphen 18 ausziehen.
19. ASUSTeK bestreitet, dass die Behauptungen in Paragraphen 19 ausziehen.

GRAF II

20. ASUSTeK wiederbehauptet und integriert von Verweis die Gesamtheit seiner Antwortengruppe an in Paragraphen 1 durch 15 oben, als ob völlig hierin dargestellt.
21. ASUSTeK bestreitet, dass die Behauptungen in Paragraphen 21 ausziehen.
22. ASUSTeK bestreitet, dass die Behauptungen in Paragraphen 22 ausziehen.
23. ASUSTeK bestreitet, dass die Behauptungen in Paragraphen 23 ausziehen.

GRAF III

24. ASUSTeK wiederbehauptet und integriert von Verweis die Gesamtheit seiner Antwortengruppe an in Paragraphen 1 durch 15 oben, als ob völlig hierin dargestellt.
25. ASUSTeK bestreitet, dass die Behauptungen in Paragraphen 25 ausziehen.
26. ASUSTeK bestreitet, dass die Behauptungen in Paragraphen 26 ausziehen.
27. ASUSTeK bestreitet, dass die Behauptungen in Paragraphen 27 ausziehen.

GRAF IV

28. ASUSTeK wiederbehauptet und integriert von Verweis die Gesamtheit seiner Antwortengruppe an in Paragraphen 1 durch 15 oben, als ob völlig hierin dargestellt.
29. ASUSTeK bestreitet, dass die Behauptungen in Paragraphen 29 ausziehen.
30. ASUSTeK bestreitet, dass die Behauptungen in Paragraphen 30 ausziehen.
31. ASUSTeK bestreitet, dass die Behauptungen in Paragraphen 31 ausziehen.

ZÄHL V

32. ASUSTeK wiederbehauptet und integriert von Verweis die Gesamtheit seiner Antwortengruppe an in Paragraphen 1 durch 15 oben, als ob völlig hierin dargestellt.
33. ASUSTeK bestreitet, dass die Behauptungen in Paragraphen 33 ausziehen.
34. ASUSTeK bestreitet, dass die Behauptungen in Paragraphen 34 ausziehen.
35. ASUSTeK bestreitet, dass die Behauptungen in Paragraphen 35 ausziehen.

GRAF VI

36. ASUSTeK wiederbehauptet und integriert von Verweis die Gesamtheit seiner Antwortengruppe an in Paragraphen 1 durch 15 oben, als ob völlig hierin dargestellt.
37. ASUSTeK bestreitet, dass die Behauptungen in Paragraphen 37 ausziehen.
38. ASUSTeK bestreitet, dass die Behauptungen in Paragraphen 38 ausziehen.
39. ASUSTeK bestreitet, dass die Behauptungen in Paragraphen 39 ausziehen.

GRAF VII

40. ASUSTeK wiederbehauptet und integriert von Verweis die Gesamtheit seiner Antwortengruppe an in Paragraphen 1 durch 15 oben, als ob völlig hierin dargestellt.
41. ASUSTeK bestreitet, dass die Behauptungen in Paragraphen 41 ausziehen.
42. ASUSTeK bestreitet, dass die Behauptungen in Paragraphen 42 ausziehen.
43. ASUSTeK bestreitet, dass die Behauptungen in Paragraphen 43 ausziehen.

GEBET FÜR ERLEICHTERUNG

44. ASUSTeK integriert hierdurch von Verweis seine Antworten auf alle Paragraphen in den Gegenforderungen als ob völlig hierin ausziehen. ASUSTeK bestreitet, dass die im TPL Entitiesâ€TM-Gebet für Erleichterung gegen ASUSTeK, oder sonst gesuchte Erleichterung zu den TPL-Entitäten berechtigt wird.

BEJAHENDE VERTEIDIGUNGEN

Zusätzlich zu den unten beschriebenen Verteidigungen, reserviert ASUSTeK alle bejahenden auf Entdeckung basierten Verteidigungen unter Regel 8 (ca.) der Bundes-Regeln von Staats-Verfahren, den Patentrechten der Vereinigten Staaten und anderen Verteidigungen, an Gesetz oder in Billigkeit, die jetzt existieren können oder in der Zukunft verfügbar sein können, und weitere faktische Untersuchung in diesem Fall:
1. Die Gegenforderungen und jede der Behauptungen berechtigen darin zu den TPL-Entitäten Erleichterung nicht weil ASUSTeK tut nicht und hat - direkt oder indirekt - gegen keinen gültigen Anspruch des patents-in-suit verstoßen.
2. Jeder Anspruch des patents-in-suit ist ungültig und/oder undurchsetzbar damit Misserfolg einen trifft oder mehr des Bedarfs an patentability ziehen in 35 aus U.S.C. 1 Et-Seq., einschließlich aber nicht auf 35 beschränkt U.S.C. 101, 102, 103 und/oder 112.
3. Die Gegenforderungen und jede der Behauptungen berechtigen darin zu den TPL-Entitäten Erleichterung nicht, weil die TPL Entitiesâ€TM-Ansprüche von laches, waiver und/oder estoppel abgesperrt werden.
4. Die TPL Entitiesâ€TM-Erholung für angeblichen Verstoß, wenn überhaupt, ist auf angeblichen nicht mehr begangenen Verstoß beschränkt als sechs Jahre vor dem Einordnen der Gegenforderungen,
entsprechend 35 U.S.C. 286.
5. Die TPL Entitiesâ€TM-Gegenforderungen werden von Versäumnis beschränkt, sich den Anforderungen von 35, U.S.C. zu fügen 287.
6. Die TPL-Entitäten werden von 35 U.S.C. abgesperrt 288, Kosten wiederzugewinnen, verband sich mit diesem Anzug.
7. Die Gegenforderungen und jede der Behauptungen versäumen darin, einen Anspruch auszusagen, auf dem Erleichterung gewährt werden kann.
8. Auf Information und Glauben werden die TPL Entitiesâ€TM-Ansprüche zu dem Umfang abgesperrt, den einiges oder alle angeklagten Aktivitäten unter dem patents-in-suit lizenziert werden.
9. Auf Information und Glauben haben die TPL-Entitäten offensichtliche Rechte gegen ASUSTeK betreffend das patents-in-suit erschöpft.
10. Auf Information und Glauben fehlen die TPL-Entitäten hinreichend richtig, betiteln, oder für das patents-in-suit interessieren um ihre Gegenforderungen aufrechtzuerhalten.
11. Auf Information und Glauben behauptet das TPL Entitiesâ€TM für Verstoß von US Glatt. Nr. 5,809,336 werden bar weil jenes Patent als ein Ergebnis von ungerechtem Lebenswandel undurchsetzbar ist.
a. Mindestens beteiligte sich Hr. George Shaw, ein Angestellter von Patrioten-Wissenschaftlich-Körperschaft, während der Verfolgung von Patentanmeldungs-Ser an ungerechtem Lebenswandel. Nr. 08/484,918, die US Glatt wurde. Nr. 5,809,336. Hr. Shaw war die Hauptliaison von Patrioten-Wissenschaftlich-Körperschaft zu seinen offensichtlichen Anwälten und wurde wesentlich deswegen an der Verfolgung von Anwendungs-Ser beteiligt. Nr. 08/484,918.
b. Während 1992 war Hr. Shaw ein Vertragsunternehmer zu Nanotronics-Körperschaft (â€oeNanotronicsâ€), an Designarbeit betreffend einen auf den ShBoom-Mikroprozessor bezogenen Mikroprozessor beteiligt, (â€oeNanotronics Microprocessorâ€).
c. Ingenieure arbeitend da Nanotronics, einschließlich Hr. Shaw, beabsichtigte im Nanotronics-Mikroprozessor zu realisieren ein kritischer Bestandteil vom geforderten Inhalt von US Glatt. Nr. 5,809,336: ein Ringoszillatorsystemtakt.
d. An einigen Punkten in frühem 1992 beschlossen für Nanotronics arbeitende Ingenieure sich der Verwendung eines Ringoszillatorsystemtakts im Nanotronics-Mikroprozessor wegen des Risikos zu enthalten dass eine Mikroprozessorbenützung, die solch eine Uhr nicht bearbeiten würde.
e. Hr. Shaw war dieser Entscheidung von Nanotronics-Ingenieuren bewusst und war der Unzulänglichkeiten in einem Ringoszillatorsystemtakt in dem 1995-2000 Malrahmen. Hr. Shaw arbeitete weiter mit einem oder mehr Ingenieuren an Patrioten-Wissenschaftlich-Körperschaft, dem Nachfolger nach Nanotronics, um Fehler im Design des in US Glatt bekannt gegebenen Ringoszillatorsystemtakts zu korrigieren. Nr. 5,809,336.
f. Hr. Shaw war die Hauptliaison und technischer Kontakt von Patrioten-Wissenschaftlich-Körperschaft für sein dann Anwalt, Willis Higgins patentieren. In jener Kapazität besuchte Hr. Shaw einige Interviews während 1997 und 1998 mit dem vom US-Patent und Warenzeichen Office nach Patentanmeldungs-Ser zugewiesenen Prüfer. Nr. 08/484,918.
g. Trotz zu glauben, dass ein Ringoszillatorsystemtakt nicht funktionieren würde, wie in Patentanmeldungs-Ser beschrieben. Nr. 08/484,918 oder jenes übermäßige Experimentieren würde erfordert werden dass man einen Mikroprozessor mit einem Funktionierenringoszillatorsystemtakt erreichen würde, sagte Hr. Shaw den Prüfer, den ein Ringoszillatorsystemtakt bearbeiten würde um einen Mikroprozessor an seiner schnellsten sicheren Arbeitsgeschwindigkeit zu treiben, damit den Eindruck überbringend, dass ein Ringoszillatorsystemtakt eine Verbesserung über anderen Taktgabesystemen war. Im Besonderen versäumte Hr. Shaw, dem Prüfer zu sagen, dass Nanotronics das Design aufgegeben hatte, weil es wahrscheinlich nicht funktionieren würde. h. Hr. Shaw täuschte absichtlich das US-Patent und Warenzeichen Office, um die Beihilfe von Patentanmeldungs-Ser zu beschleunigen. Nr. 08/484,918. i. Der Betrug bezog sich auf materielle Tatsachen, die, wenn sie völlig dem Prüfer bekannt gegeben worden wären, dem Prüfer erlaubt hätten, eine erkennbare Ablehnung hinunter 35 zu U.S.C. zu machen 112. j. Mindestens beteiligte sich Hr. Higgins während der Verfolgung von Patentanmeldungs-Ser an ungerechtem Lebenswandel. Nr. 08/484,918, die US Glatt wurde. Nr. 5,809,336. Hr. Higgins war der verfolgende für die Verfolgung von Anwendungs-Ser verantwortliche Anwalt. Nr. 08/484,918.
k. Hr. Higgins täuschte absichtlich das US-Patent und Warenzeichen Office nah, bejahend behauptend, dass Hr. Moore und Hr. Fish Coerfinder von Anwendungs-Ser waren. Nr. 08/484,918 und niemals diese Erklärung von inventorship korrigierend.

GEBET FÜR ERLEICHTERUNG WHEREFORE, ASUSTeK um Urteil folgendermaßen beten:
1. Urteils-Ordnen dass die TPL-Entitäten bestritten werden dass alle Erleichterung in ihren Gegenforderungen verlangte und nichts brauchen;
2. Erklärendes und erklärendes Urteil, das ASUSTeK, direkt oder indirekt, gegen keinen gültigen Anspruch des patents-in-suit, wie richtig verstanden, verstoßen hat, wörtlich oder
unter der Doktrin von Äquivalenten;
3. Das erklärendes und für das patents-in-suit erklärendes Urteil sind ungültig;
4. Das erklärendes und für das patents-in-suit erklärendes Urteil sind
undurchsetzbar;
5. Urteil, das ASUSTeK zuerkennt, das all seine Kosten sich aufluden wenn sie auf die Gegenforderungen reagierten, einschließlich aber nicht auf ASUSTeKâ€TMs attorneysâ€TM-Honorare entsprechend 35 beschränkt U.S.C. 285;
6. Urteils-Gewähren ASUSTeK solche andere und weitere Erleichterung als das Gericht denkt gerade und richtig.

man keinen Langenscheid. Es ist typisches Anwaltsgeschwafel. Alles wird mit Nichtwissen bestritten. Natürlich sind Acer und Co alles unschuldige Unternehmen die sich von TPL zu Unrecht bedroht fühlen. Also, typisches Anwalts Blabla

ich schon, also alles beim Alten ,man wehrt sich mit Händen und Füssen,
danke und noch einen schönen Sonnttag

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von: wolfpackvolt

New Pacer--AGREED MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME FOR PLAINTIFFS
posted on Dec 15, 08 03:01PM

New Pacer--AGREED MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME FOR PLAINTIFFS TO FILE RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TRANSFER TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS MARSHALL DIVISION
Plaintiffs,
(1) TECHNOLOGY PROPERTIES
LIMITED, INC. and (2) PATRIOT
SCIENTIFIC CORPORATION,
JURY DEMANDED
vs.
(1) HTC CORPORATION and
(2) HTC AMERICA, INC.
Defendants.

AGREED MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME FOR PLAINTIFFS TO FILE RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TRANSFER TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

Plaintiffs Technology Properties Limited, Inc. and Patriot Scientific Corporation file this Agreed Motion to Extend Time for Plaintiffs to file their Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Transfer and would respectfully show the Court as follows: Plaintiffs have requested an extension of time to file their Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Transfer and Defendants, HTC Corporation and HTC America, Inc. have agreed to such an extension. Therefore, Plaintiffs respectfully request that they be granted an extension of time to file their Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Transfer up to and including December 29,2008. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiffs Technology Properties Limited, Inc. and Patriot Scientific Corporation respectfully move the Court to extend the deadline as set forth 1 Case 2:08-cv-00172-TJW Document 23 Filed 12/15/2008 Page 1 of 4 above pursuant to the request of the parties and award the parties such other and further relief as they may show themselves justly entitled.
Dated: December 15, 2008 Respectfully submitted, Of Counsel:
Ronald F. Lopez
California Bar No. 11756
Nixon Peabody LLP
One Embarcadero Center, 18th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111-3600
Robert E. Krebs
California Bar No. 57526
Christopher L. Ogden
California Bar No. 235517
Nixon Peabody LLP
200 Page Mill Road, Suite 200
Palo Alto, CA 94306-2022
By: lsi N. Claire Abernathy
S. Calvin Capshaw
State Bar No. 03783900
Elizabeth L. DeRieux
State Bar No. 05770585
N. Claire Abernathy
State Bar No. 24053063
Capshaw DeRieux, LLP
1127 Judson Road, Suite 220
Longview, TX 75601
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF TECHNOLOGY PROPERTIES LIMITED 2 Case 2:08-cv-00172-TJW Document 23 Filed 12/15/2008 Page 2 of 4
By: lsi Charles Ainsworth by permission NCA
Robert M. Parker
State Bar No. 15498000
Robert Christopher Bunt
State Bar No. 00787165
Email: rcbunt@pbatyler.com
Charles Ainsworth
State Bar No. 00783521
Parker, Bunt & Ainsworth, P.C.
100 East Ferguson, Ste. 1114
Tyler, TX 75702
Charles T. Roge
California Bar No. 110696
Kirby Noonan Lance & Roge, LLP
350 Tenth Avenue, Suite 1300
San Diego, CA 92101
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
PATRIOT SCIENTIFIC CORPORATION CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE
I certify that I have complied with the meet and confer requirement in Local Rule CV-7(R) and this motion is unopposed.
lsi N. Claire Abernathy
N. Claire Abernathy

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that all counsel of record who are deemed to have consented to electronic service are being served with a copy of this document via the Court's CMlECF system per Local Rule CV-5(a)(3) on December 15, 2008. Any other counsel of record will be served by facsimile transmission and first class mail.
lsi N. Claire Abernathy
N. Claire Abernathy

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New pacer--PROCEEDINGS: Defendant’s Motion to Compel Deposition
posted on Dec 16, 08 08:36PM
New pacer--PROCEEDINGS: Defendant’s Motion to Compel Deposition
Counsel present arguments.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN JOSE DIVISION
Magistrate Judge Howard R. Lloyd, Presiding Courtroom 2 - 5th Floor Civil Minute Order
Date: December 16, 2008 Time in Court: 22 minutes
Courtroom Deputy Clerk: Patty Cromwell
Court Reporter/FTR: FTR
TITLE: Acer, Inc., et. al. v. Technology Properties Limited, et. al.
CASE NUMBER: C08-00877JF
Plaintiff Attorney present: Harold Davis
Defendant Attorney present: Eugene Mar and Jeffrey Fisher
PROCEEDINGS: Defendant’s Motion to Compel Deposition
Counsel present arguments.
Matter is taken under submission. Court to issue written ruling.


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2nd Pacer--ORDER (Signed by Judge HOWARD R. LLOYD) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

posted on Dec 16, 08 08:51PM

2nd Pacer--ORDER (Signed by Judge HOWARD R. LLOYD) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFFS’ DEPOSITIONS

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN JOSE DIVISION
ACER, INC., ACER AMERICA
CORPORATION, GATEWAY, INC.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
TECHNOLOGY PROPERTIES, PATRIOT
SCIENTIFIC CORPORATION, ALLIACENSE
LIMITED,
Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFFS’ DEPOSITIONS
[Re: Docket No. 55]
Apparently after licensing negotiations were unsuccessful, Acer, Inc. (“AI”), Acer America Corporation, and Gateway, Inc. brought this declaratory relief action against Technology Properties Limited, Patriot Scientific Corporation, and Alliacense Limited to establish that plaintiffs’ products do not infringe defendants’ patents. Defendants moved to dismiss or, alternatively, to transfer the case to the Eastern District of Texas, where two of the patents at issue had previously been construed. Plaintiffs, in part, opposed the transfer because the Northern District of California was a less burdensome forum for discovery, as “witnesses and representatives are able to take a direct flight to San Francisco.” Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, Docket No. 34, pg 10, footnote 4. The motion to dismiss or transfer was denied. In its initial disclosure, AI identified seventeen employees that live and work in Taiwan as persons with discoverable information. In planning for discovery, defendants requested that AI agree to produce these employees for deposition in the Northern District of California. AI objects, saying defendants should go to Taiwan for the depositions. Defendants now move for an order compelling AI to produce the seventeen for deposition in this district. Since no deposition has been noticed, the court will treat this motion as one for a protective order. The matter has been fully briefed. The court held a hearing on December 16, 2008. Upon consideration of the papers filed by the parties, and the arguments of counsel, this court grants the motion in part and denies the motion in part.

Discussion

A party may unilaterally choose the place for deposing the opposing party, subject to the granting of a protective order by the Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(2). Turner v. Prudential Ins. Co., 119 F.R.D. 381, 383 (M.D. NC 1988). When the opposing party is a corporation, both its officers and directors and its employees have been treated as “opposing parties,” the same as an Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) designee. See Delphi Automotive Systems LLC v. Shinwa Intern. Holdings LTD, 2008 WL 2906765 at *3 (S.D.Ind., 2008); Cadent Ltd. v. 3M Unitek Corp., 232 F.R.D. 625, 628 (C.D.Cal.,2005). In determining the appropriate place for such depositions, the trial court has broad discretion. Id. However, as a general rule, “plaintiff will be required to make himself or herself available for examination in the district in which suit was brought.” Lexington Ins. Co v. Commonwealth Ins. Co, 1999 WL 33292943 at *9 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (citing WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 2112 at 75.) Other courts have observed that “[this rule] not only permits predictability in prospective litigation, it also pragmatically permits the trial court to resolve disputes which may take place during the course of depositions without undue expenditure of time.” Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Dacar Chemical Products, Co., 707 F.Supp. 793, 795 (W.D.Pa.1989). The court is not persuaded by plaintiffs’ contentions that they didn’t “choose” to bring the lawsuit, or “choose” this forum because plaintiffs were “forced” to bring the lawsuit, and this was the only possible venue. AI has cited cases supporting their contention that 30(b)(6) witnesses should be deposed at their principal place of business, namely Taiwan. Nevertheless, at this point, no one knows whether any of the Taiwanese seventeen will be designated as Acer’s witness for a 30(b)(6) deposition. And, although there is a general presumption that the deposition of a corporate party
should be taken at its place of business, see, e.g., Thomas v. Int’l Business Machines, 48 F.3d 478, 483 (10th Cir. 1995), that presumption is not conclusive. Courts in this district have noted that courts primarily apply this rule to defendants, since plaintiffs have the luxury of choosing the forum. See Lexington at *9. Especially here, where plaintiffs not only chose this forum, but fought for it because it was more convenient for its witnesses to travel to, the court gives little weight to plaintiffs’ complaints that the forum is inconvenient and costly.
Lead counsel for all parties are located in this district. Plaintiffs specifically chose and fought for this forum to reduce discovery costs, at least in part. In addition, this court's authority to resolve any disputes arising during a deposition could be compromised by sovereignty issues if depositions took place in Taiwan, rather than in the United States. “If a federal court compels discovery on foreign soil, foreign judicial sovereignty may be infringed, but when depositions of foreign nationals are taken on American or neutral soil, courts have concluded that comity concerns are not implicated.” Delphi Automotive Systems, at *2. Based on the record presented, the court finds that it will be less costly and disruptive to have all AI’s 30(b)(6) designees deposed in this district. AI shall bear all travel costs associated with their designated 30(b)(6) witness(es). The depositions of any non-30(b)(6) designated officers, directors, or AI employees shall also take place in this district. However, defendants shall pay the cost of business class airfare for these deponents. Should defendants find it more cost effective to take the AI employees’ depositions in Taiwan, they may elect to proceed instead as proposed in AI’s opposition papers. Although the main dispute appears to center around the deposition of AI’s employees, the parties have also raised the issue of where employees of Acer America and Gateway should be deposed. Since Acer America’s principal place of business is San Jose, California, there can be little argument that its employees should be deposed in this district. The Gateway employees
identified are located in Irvine, California and Sioux City, South Dakota. Again, any 30(b)(6) depositions shall proceed in this district, with Gateway bearing the costs. Any non-30(b)(6) depositions shall also proceed in this district, with defendants paying the cost of the deponents’ business class airfare. Again, should defendants find it more cost effective to take these employees’ depositions in their respective locations, they may arrange with Gateway to proceed in that way. Since the court cannot contemplate every possible factual scenario that may arise as to a particular deponent and the possible unfairness or reasonableness of him or her having to travel to the Northern District of California, this order is without prejudice to any party’s ability to move for an exception for any individual deposition, should the parties’ vigorous meet and confer efforts fail.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed and Dated: 12/16/08
HOWARD R. LLOYD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Wenn ich es richtig verstanden habe, kommt es zur Verhandlung, aber in Calfornien.
Der 2. Pacer regelt, wer ewelche Kosten zu tragen hat.
Acer hat nach Clifornien zu kommen.

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Re: 2nd Pacer--ORDER (Signed by Judge HOWARD R. LLOYD) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING
in response to Re: 2nd Pacer--ORDER (Signed by Judge HOWARD R. LLOYD) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING by jldmt
posted on Dec 17, 08 06:38AM
The way I read this order, and based on the definition of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6), paragraph 6 of which I have copied at the end of my post, is that the Plaintiff is responsible for travel expenses to bring those deponents already designated as persons who consent to testify on their behalf (the 17 already identified by AI, for example). The Defendants are responsible for the cost for deponents that are in addition to those already identified.

Corrections from those who are knowledgeable in the legal system are welcome (I am not).

Rule 30. Deposition by Oral Examination

(b) Notice of the Deposition; Other Formal Requirements.

(6) Notice or Subpoena Directed to an Organization.

In its notice or subpoena, a party may name as the deponent a public or private corporation, a partnership, an association, a governmental agency, or other entity and must describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination. The named organization must then designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or designate other persons who consent to testify on its behalf; and it may set out the matters on which each person designated will testify. A subpoena must advise a nonparty organization of its duty to make this designation. The persons designated must testify about information known or reasonably available to the organization. This paragraph (6) does not preclude a deposition by any other procedure allowed by these rules.

Cheers,

DG