Der USA Bären-Thread

Ist das nicht bullisch, wenn die Fallgeschwindigkeit der Indizes abnimmt?

Liiibuuudaaa - bitte einen neuen Thread dazu !

Fallgeschwindigkeit der Wirtschaft. Wie schnell die Aktien fallen werden ist eine andere Baustelle. Letzteres hängt im wesentlichen davon ab wie schnell oder langsam die Realitätsverluste abgebaut werden.

2x oder 3x ETFs auf? Das ist ein Anlageinstrument das durchaus seine Berechtigung hat. Man muss eben die Rollverluste einkalkulieren, wenn man sich für dieses Investment entscheidet. Beachte mal dieses Posting von mir (der erwähnte LevDAX hat sogar eine Bremse, die seine Verluste künstlich begrenzt, seine Gewinne jedoch nicht).

Habe hier mal eine Beispieltabelle, die das Underlying und einen 2x long ETF vergleicht. Die Renditen sind kumuliert ausgewiesen, so dass man genau sehen kann welche Gesamtrendite zum jeweiligen Zeitpunkt erreicht wurde. Du siehst, dass der 2x ETF bei monoton steigenden Kursen sehr gut abschneidet, aber im volatilen Seitwärtsmarkt (grau unterlegt) stark underperformt. Diesem Beispiel habe ich ein "happy end" gegeben, um zu zeigen dass Rollverluste nicht alles zunichte machen müssen.

www.ftd.de/unternehmen/finanzdienstleister/...bank/497914.html

 

FTD

 

...Die Hamburger Staatsanwaltschaft hat gegen Verantwortliche der Landesbank ein Ermittlungsverfahren eingeleitet. Die Behörde prüfe den Verdacht der Untreue im Zusammenhang mit der Finanzmarktkrise, sagte Sprecher Wilhelm Möllers am Dienstag.

Das Verfahren gehe auf eine Strafanzeige des Hamburger Rechtsanwalts Gerhard Strate zurück. Gegen welche und wie viele Verantwortliche sich die Ermittlungen konkret richten, sagte Möllers nicht: "Wir haben noch keinen namentlich Verantwortlichen herausgearbeitet."

Der Vorstand einer Kapitalgesellschaft habe die Pflicht, das Vermögen der Aktionäre "wie ein sorgfältiger und gewissenhafter Kaufmann zu betreuen", heißt es in Strates Anzeige. Außerdem müsse die Führungsspitze bedenken, dass bei einer Insolvenz der Bank die sogenannte Gewährträgerhaftung der Hauptanteilseigner - der Länder Hamburg und Schleswig-Holstein - greift "und letztlich der Steuerzahler für die Verluste der Bank einzustehen hat". "Vor diesem Hintergrund waren ihm (dem Vorstand) risikobehaftete Geschäfte, die spekulativen Charakter trugen, von vornherein verboten...

Sowohl in wirtschaftlichen Rezessionen als auch in Baissephasen der Aktienmärkte gibt es stets starke Downmoves und mehr oder weniger starke Erholungsphasen. Die Fallgeschwindigkeit des DOW, die MA 100 im Tageschart reflektiert, ist aktuell zwar etwas gebremst, doch sie dürfte sich erneut verstärken.

I said it yesterday, and I’ll say it every day: Until the number of foreclosures in this country starts to go down instead of up, we will not see a full recovery in the housing market; I don’t care how upbeat you are about buyer traffic this spring.

A new report out today shows foreclosures continue to rise.

 

Equifax, a well-respected credit bureau, found that 7% of homeowners with mortgages that were at least 30 days late on their payments in February, that’s up 50% from a year ago. And close to 40% of subprime borrowers are late, up from 23.7% a year ago.

Then I get an email from mortgage guru Mark Hansen of the Field Check Group, who tells me that foreclosures are about to soar in California near-term:

For months prior to March, banks/servicers were on and off of foreclosure moratoria with many on a complete hold awaiting Pres. Obama’s plan to save the housing market and homeowners. We track each foreclosure start through the entire foreclosure process individually and in aggregate - also by originator and servicer - and as soon as the Obama plan was made known, banks/servicer shifted their Notice-of-Default and Notice-of-Trustee Sale machines into overdrive. Foreclosure start (NOD) and Trustee Sale (NTS) notices are going out at levels not seen since mid 2008. Once an NTS goes out, the property is taken to the courthouse and auctioned within 21-45 days.

On top of that, my colleague Jane Wells is out in the foreclosure capital of the world today, Stockton, CA, and while she reports good news that houses there are finally selling, the bad news, she says is that more and more as major lenders seek out troubled borrowers for modifications, that find, “the people are gone. Even if they’ve not been foreclosed on yet!”

Not good. With job numbers getting worse, more and more borrowers are going to end up missing payments, and no matter how much the banks and the Obama administration would like to help these folks, you can’t modify a loan down to a zero monthly payment.

Die Boyz haben wohl Angst, dass der Test selber Stress auslöst.

Mich würde als Long schon die Tatsache stressen, dass der Stress-Test offenbar nicht für stress-fest gehalten wird.

 

Quelle Street.com/CC

 

(nach unten)

ging hang man schon die Puste aus. Morgen wird er mit großer Wahrscheinlichkeit dem DOW folgen. Na ja, morgen also noch short im DAX und dann? Mal sehen.

Doch, es ist adverbial -- "intellectual honest" waere falsch (und klingt wie "Hermann se Germann")

"intellectually" beschreibt, in welcher Hinsicht "honest" "honest" ist.

Vgl. z.B. "generally correct" (nicht "general correct")

Nachdem heute Morgen erkennbar war, dass das Up-Gap zu Handelsbeginn sofort wieder abverkauft wurde, habe ich einen Wiedereinstieg auf der Shortseite gewagt. Die Entwicklung des L-Tecdax ist viel versprechend.

April 06, 2009

Fighting Recklessness with Recklessness
by John Mauldin
 

This week we visit some very thoughtful analysis by an old friend of Outside the Box, Dr. John Hussman of the Hussman Funds (www.hussmanfunds.com/index.html). Is the new PPIP program and related activities likely to help or hurt the situation? Will this help keep banks for bankruptcy or will it push the FDIC into insolvency requiring massive tax payer cash. This week's Outside the Box is brief, but poignant.

John Mauldin, Editor
Outside the Box




--------------------------------------------------



Fighting Recklessness with Recklessness
By John P. Hussman, Ph.D

Last week saw a continuation of the impenetrably misguided policy response to this financial crisis, which seeks to address the downturn by encouraging more of what got us into this mess in the first place. The U.S. Treasury's toxic assets plan, for instance, looks to "leverage" public funds (with the FDIC providing the "6-to-1 leverage") in order to defend the bondholders of mismanaged financials who took excessive leverage. At the same time, the Treasury plans to limit the "competitive bidding" to a few hand-picked "managers" who will be encouraged to overpay thanks to put options granted at public expense. This is a recipe for the insolvency of the FDIC and an attempt to bail out bank bondholders using funds that have not even been allocated by Congress. The whole plan is a bureaucratic abuse of the FDIC's balance sheet, which exists to protect ordinary depositors, not bank bondholders.

On Thursday, the stock market cheered a move by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to relax FAS-157 (the "mark-to-market" accounting rule), allowing nearly insolvent financial companies to use more discretion in the models they use to assess fair value. Of course, the irresponsibly rosy assumptions built into these models have been a large contributor to this near-insolvency, because they virtually ignored foreclosure risks.

Notably, the one thing policy-makers have not done is to address foreclosure abatement in any serious way. The only way to get through this crisis without enormous collateral damage to ordinary Americans is by restructuring mortgage obligations (ideally using property appreciation rights), restructuring the debt obligations of distressed financial companies (ideally by requiring bondholders to swap a portion of their debt for equity), and abandoning the idea of using public funds to purchase un-restructurable mortgage debt ("toxic assets"). See On the Urgency of Restructuring Bank and Mortgage Debt, and of Abandoning Toxic Asset Purchases.

Look. You can play hot potato with the toxic assets all day long, and only outcome will be that the public will suffer the losses that would otherwise have been properly taken by the banks' own bondholders. You can tinker with the accounting rules all you want, and it won't make the banks solvent. It may improve "reported" earnings for a spell, but as investors who care about the stream of future cash flows that will actually be delivered to us over time, it is clear that modifying the accounting rules doesn't create value. It simply increases the likelihood that financial institutions will quietly go insolvent. I recognize that the accounting changes may reduce the immediate need for regulatory action, since banks will be able to pad their Tier 1 capital with false hope. But we have done nothing to abate foreclosures, and we are just about to begin a huge reset cycle for Alt-A's and option-ARMs. As the underlying mortgages go into foreclosure, it will ultimately become impossible to argue that the toxic assets would be worth much even in an "orderly transaction."

Meanwhile, in a bizarre convolution of reality reminiscent of Alice in Wonderland, the Financial Times reported last week: "US banks that have received government aid, including Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and JPMorgan Chase, are considering buying toxic assets to be sold by rivals under the Treasury's $1,000bn plan to revive the financial system." And why not? They can put up a few percent of their own money, and swap each other's toxic assets financed by a bewildered public suddenly bearing more than 90% of the downside risk. The "investors" in this happy "public-private partnership" keep half the upside while ordinary Americans take the downside off of their hands. Some partnership.

With regard to the economy, there is quite a bit of optimism that the recent market advance represents a forward-looking call that the economy will recover in the second half of the year. Indeed, some analysts have noted that year-over-year consumer spending has only declined very slightly, hailing this as evidence that economic concerns are overblown. The difficulty is that consumer spending has never declined on a year-over-year basis, except in this downturn, so that slight decline is actually the worst showing for consumer spending in the available data. Likewise, capacity utilization has plunged to levels seen only in 1974 and 1982, both which were accompanied by far deeper valuation extremes than at present.

I recognize that given the depth of the recent decline, it seems as if stocks must be at once-in-a-lifetime valuations. Unfortunately, this is an artifact of the previous level of overvaluation. The depth of a bear market often has a loose relationship with the extent of the prior bull market (and particularly with the level of valuation of the prior bull), but there is very little relationship between the depth of a bear market and the subsequent bull.

If we assume that the long-term fundamentals of the economy have not been affected in any meaningful way by this economic downturn, then stocks are most likely priced to deliver long-term returns between 9-11% annually over the coming decade, with outlier possibilities of as much as 14% if the market ends the coming decade at historically overvalued levels, and as little as 4% if the market ends the coming decade at historically undervalued levels. Far from being once-in-a-lifetime values, prospective 10-year returns on the S&P 500 are not far from their historical norms here. Stocks are about fairly valued.

The only way that stocks could be considered extremely undervalued here is if we assume that the record profit margins of 2007 (based on record corporate leverage) are the norm, and will be quickly recovered. While we never rule out the potential for surprising strength or weakness in the markets or the economy, the assumption that profit margins will permanently recover to 2007 levels is equivalent to assuming that the past 18 months simply did not happen.

Still, given sufficient evidence of broad improvement in market action (which we take as a measure of risk tolerance and economic expectations), we wouldn't fight the combination of roughly fair values and a willingness of investors to bear risk. We've been carrying small "contingent" call option positions for a good portion of the recent advance. This helped to compensate for our low weightings in financials, homebuilders and other low-quality sectors that have enjoyed frantic short-covering. Still, with only about 1% of assets currently in those calls, our stance is still characterized as defensive here, as we are otherwise fully hedged. Again, we won't fight a broad improvement if it continues sufficiently, but if I were to make a guess, it would be that the potential downside in the S&P 500 from these levels could approach 30-40%. That is not a typo, and it is not a possibility that should be ruled out.

I have no idea how long investors will remain enthusiastic about trillion dollar band-aids and eroding the integrity of our accounting rules. I do know that at the end of the day, what matters is the long-term stream of deliverable cash flows that investors can actually expect to reach their hands. It's exactly that consideration that makes it clear that we will sink deeper into this crisis until we observe debt restructuring on a large scale. If we don't restructure the debt, the debt will fail, because for many borrowers, the cash flows aren't there, and it is not possible to service the debt on existing terms.

Thirty-five companies defaulted in March, the highest number in a single month since the Great Depression, according to Moody’s Investors Service.

The rate at which speculative-grade corporate borrowers worldwide failed to meet their obligations rose to 7 percent from 4.1 percent at the end of last year, Moody’s said in a report today. So far this year, 79 companies rated by Moody’s have defaulted, the New York-based ratings firm said.

Almost $1.3 trillion of losses and writedowns at financial institutions worldwide, combined with the deepest economic slowdown since World War II, have weakened companies’ finances, reducing their ability to pay debt. The global default rate will peak at 14.6 percent in the final quarter of the year, Moody’s predicted, lower than last month’s 15.3 percent forecast......

globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/2009/...-rate-highest.html

und dass die Rezession in Europa sich verschlimmert hat laut Angaben des EU-Statistikamtes in Luxemburg kommt ja auch nicht überraschend www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aqt0ZE12oZTQ

wirtschaftquerschuss.blogspot.com/2009/04/...hinenbau-mit.html
Die Entwicklung der deutschen Auftragseingänge von Februar 2005-Februar 2009! Die Inlandsaufträge brachen im Februar 2009 um -45% zum Vorjahresmonat weg und die Auslandsaufträge um -50%. Quelle Daten:www.vdma.org

www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001&sid=aJSFrifNWAEE

Nette Prognose von Moody´s, dass der Zenith in Q4/2009 mit "voraussehbaren" Prozentzahlen erreicht wird! lol!

Sicherheit aller Leute sagte der Ceo von Goldman Sachs heute in einer fulminanten Rede über die Ursachen der Krise und Selbstanklage
www.businessinsider.com/...and-security-of-every-person-2009-4
....To begin with an obvious point, much of the past year has been deeply humbling for my industry. We held ourselves up as the experts, and the loss of public confidence from failing to live up to the expectations that we created will take years to rebuild. Worse, decisions on compensation and other actions taken and not taken, particularly at banks that rapidly lost a lot of shareholder value, look self-serving and greedy in hindsight.

Financial institutions have an obligation to the broader financial system. We depend on a healthy, well-functioning system, but we collectively neglected to raise enough questions about whether some of the trends and practices that became commonplace really served the public’s long-term interests.

Meaningful change and effective reform are vital and should naturally emanate from the lessons learned. I will discuss a few of the more important lessons from this crisis. I’d also like to highlight some of the regulatory guideposts that may help us to improve the broader systemic management of risk, increase the level of institutional accountability and enhance investor confidence.........

..Certainly, what started in a localized part of the U.S. mortgage market spread to virtually every corner of the global financial markets. But the genesis of the problem wasn’t in sub-prime. Instead, the roots of the damage to our financial system are broad and deep. They coalesced over many years to create a sustained period of cheap credit and excess liquidity. The resulting under-pricing of risk led to massive leverage across wide swaths of the economy – from households to the corporate sector to the public sector.

I see at least three broad underlying factors:

• First, there has been enormous growth in the amount of foreign capital, much of it held in large pools, and a very significant shift in the balance of payments of many emerging markets;
• Second, and linked to this, nearly ten years of low long-term interest rates; and
• Third, the official policy of subsidizing homeownership in the United States......

lang aber wert zu lesen

You can't push a string, as they say. And all the liquidity programs and guarantees in the world won't help if consumers stubbornly refuse to borrow money.
www.businessinsider.com/...f-demand-for-consumer-credit-2009-4

ebenso Greatest Credit Card Debt Plunge Ever
www.businessinsider.com/...credit-card-debt-plunge-ever-2009-4

Alcoa swings to loss as aluminum prices plunge
By Shawn Langlois
Last update: 4:11 p.m. EDT April 7, 2009

SAN FRANCISCO (MarketWatch) -- Alcoa Inc. (AA, -1.4%) on Tuesday reported a first-quarter loss $497 million, or 61 cents a share, vs. a profit of $303 million, or 37 cents a share a year ago. Excluding discontinued operations, Alcoa would have posted a loss of 59 cents a share. Analysts polled by FactSet Research were looking for a loss, on average, of 51 cents a share. A Reuters Estimates survey came up with a target of a 54-cent loss. Sales fell to $4.1 billion from $5.7 billion a year ago. Wall Street had forecast sales of $4.68 billion. End of Story

Ein kleiner Hinweis zu Adverben im Englischen sei mir noch gestattet. Es ist wohl wahr, dass Amerikaner eher als Englaender ein Adverb zwischen to und Infinitiv (oder Hilfsverb und Verb) stellen, doch tut man das auch in Amerika nicht in jeder Situation. Es macht einen Unterschied, ob die Gesamthandlung bzw. der Kontext des Satzes beschrieben wird oder aber das Verb im engeren Sinne. Also z.B. "to boldly go where no man has gone before" (Star Trek) aber "the chemical reaction is studied experimentally"  und nicht "is experimentally studied". Konstruktionen wie die letztere liest man oefter mal in Artikeln von Nichtmuttersprachlern, sie hoeren sich aber nicht idiomatisch an, sondern gewollt amerikanisch -- man nennt das in der Linguistik "hyperkorrekt".

Ich meinte Hilfsverb und Partizip od. Gerundium (in Konstruktionen wie "is studied", "is studying").

Die Kurve des ECRI Frühindikatoren Index steht aus technischer Sicht aktuell an einem sehr kritischen Punkt. Ein Bruch des Basisuptrends seit 1974 gäbe zu schlimmsten Befürchtungen Anlass.

here comes a real American Corporation trading pot...

 

Posted April 7th, 2009 by theStockMasters...in Financial News

           

God Bless America, you can't make up stories this good, long live capitalism and now welcome Medical Marijuana, Inc. (OTC:CVIV) trading at $1.44 a share.  Now you can invest in the "emerging legal medical marijuana industry".  Move over War on Drugs, here comes a real American Corporation trading pot.

Its real fellow Masters, here's the link to Yahoo Finance - Medical Marijuana, Inc. (OTC:CVIV), they have yet to have their name changed recorded from Club Vivanet to Medical Marijuana Inc. but its all there.

Here's the press release the company put out this week - enjoy.

Irland kämpft anders      

www.n-tv.de/1134322.html

Dein Einwand zur Grammatik ist korrekt. Es gibt allerdings auch "intellectual honest", wobei honest ein Kurzform von honesty (also ein Substantiv) ist:

www.essay-911.com/samples/intellectual-honest.htm